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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have witnessed significant developments
in employment termination law in the United States. The
long-standing "at-will" doctrine^ - employers can fire
employees for good reason, bad reason, or even for no
reason at all - has experienced great erosion and wide
variations in law between the states.
There are two types of exceptions to the employment
at-will rule: statutory exceptions and common law excep-
tions. Statutory exceptions include federal and state
legislations specifying forbidden motivations for discharge,
such as race, sex, religion or national origin,^ age,"^
handicap,'^ or union activity.^
^H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§134, (1877)
.
^Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§2000
to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985)
.
^Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§2-16,
29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985).
^The American Disabilities Act of 1990.
^National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended; 29 U.S.C. §§151-69 (1988).
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Common law exceptions generally fall under one of
two categories: either tort theory or contract theory.
The tort theories of wrongful discharge are not concerned
with the private agreement between the parties to the at
will employment contract. Rather, they seek to vindicate
some public policy independent of the terms of any
particular employment contract. Under the contract theories,
courts find legal protection for employees by enforcing the
private terms of their employment contract. By 1991, 45
states had recognized at least some exceptions to the at
will doctrine,^ and one state, Montana, had enacted a
wrongful discharge act into law."^ The movement of statutory
and common law restrictions limiting an employer's freedom
to terminate at will reflects the increasing consciousness
about the importance of job security by society and workers.
This tendency is also consistent with the developments of
other industrialized countries in the West and Japan in
which the problem of job security has been addressed with
increased frequency in the post World War II period.^
Protection of jobs is commonly important to all the
employees in the United States. The increasing number of
^"At-Will Doctrine Under Fire," 14 Nat ' 1 L. J. No6,
page 1 (Oct. 14, 1991)
.
'Mont. Code Ann. §§39-2-901 to 914 (1991)
.
^W. Gould IV, Job Security in the United States: Some
Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure
Legislation from a Comparative Perspective, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 2!
(1988) .
lawsuits brought by employees, protesting their termina-
tions as being unlawful, represent their cry for job
security. An employer's right to arbitrarily discharge
might be convenient for running its business without
interference. At the same time, however, it would
unfavorably affect the company's long-run success. The
arbitrary discharge would cause a waste of training,
continuity, and expertise and bring unfavorable effects on
employees' morale, loyalty, motivation, and thereby
business productivity in the long term because of the
employee's fear of being discharged.^ It is necessary to
create a stable work environment in which employees can
work productively without having uncertainty about their
future in the workplace.
The stable work environment, however, does not force
employers to keep inefficient or unproductive workers but
only requires them to have a clear, legitimate, and job-
related cause of discharge. Job security can foster
employee identification with the goals of the company,^"
^See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge : The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1816, 1834-35 (1980) . See generally,
SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 166 (1972)
.
^°G. Minda & K. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal
Statute in New York, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1137, 1179 (1989).
("Some private corporations have recognized these
employment values and have implemented their own fair
employment procedures. Federal Express, Citicorp, and
which would be proved by the experience of other
industrialized countries including Japan'^ and Germany. ^^
The comprehensive protection of employees outside the
unionized'-^ and public sectors^"^ is particularly one of the
important issues to be solved because these employees
constitute a majority of the United States work force.
Eighty-five percent of the present American work force,
consisting of over approximately eighty-three million
workers, are employed under the at-will doctrine. '° The non-
unionized employees are discharged at a rate two times that
International Business Machines have adopted their own
internal fair dismissal procedures.").
'^The lifetime employment in Japan is a practice, not
forced by a law or a contract. This practice has been
widely applies and accepted by labor and management. See
also RoDO KijuNHo (Labor Code), Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 20.
^^See Note, supra note 9, at 1836 n.l04. See also, C.
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal
:
Time for a Statute, 62 Va.L.Rev. 481, 511 (1976)
.
^^Most of the unionized workers enjoy job security
under a "just cause" provision of collective bargaining
agreements. See generally, A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman,
Labor Law 701-02 (10th ed. 1986) ; see 2 Collective
Bargaining, Negot. & Cort. (BNA) §40:1, at 121 (1986)
(grounds for discharge found in 941 of contract analyzed)
.
''^Public employees covered by state and federal civil
service statutes who generally cannot be fired without
cause and without a hearing. As to discharge of civil
service workers, 15 A Am Jur 2d, Civil Service §§68 et seq.
'•'R. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment
Handbooks : Further Encroachments on the Employment -At -Will
Doctrine, 139 U.Pa.L.Rev. 197, note 1 (1990).
of unionized workers,'^ and some 1.4 million of these
workers are terminated from their job each year.^'^ The
disparity in the right and privileges of the American work
force obviously has a significant effect on the at-will
employee. Since it is unlikely that the complicated array
of statutory and common law exceptions to the at-will
presumption corrects the disparity in employment environ-
ments and uniformly provides all the employees with job
security, a comprehensive statutory approach to employment
termination would be the best solution.
This article, by consistently focusing on the problem
of job security, contends that total abolition of at-will
employment by unjust-dismissal legislation will ultimately
be necessary for all employees to be fully protected
against wrongful discharge.
Part II of this article traces the origin of the at-
will doctrine to 19th century principles favoring economic
individualism and formalistic interpretation of contracts
and proves that there is a distinct difference in the
social backgrounds between the past and the present. Part
III examines the doctrinal basis for the at-will rule in
light of modern tort and contract principles. Part IV
reconsiders the subjects of Part II and III in relation to
job security and discusses the total abolishment of the at
'^Hames, The Current Status of the Doctrine of
Employment -At -Will, 39 Lab. L.J. 19, 19 (1988).
17Pratt, supra note 15, at 197 n.3.
will rule by legislative action. Part V advocates a
federal statute requiring employers to fire employees only
for good cause. It begins by dealing with the Montana
Statute and Model Employment Termination Act and then
analyzes the concept of "good cause". It also examines the
coverage of a just cause statute, including topics such as
remedies and procedures.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
AND HISTORICAL EXCEPTIONS
A. Wood's Rule
The employment at-will doctrine grew out of the pre-
industrial concepts of master and servant in the 19th
century whose relations were rooted in feudalism and
family/^ where the employer took responsibility for the
servant's health and well-being. In an 1877 treatise, ^^
Horace G. Wood articulated that a hiring for an indefinite
period was presumptively a hiring at will, which could be
terminated at any time by either party. ^° This so-called
Wood's principle was first adopted by the New York court in
the Martin case^^ and then became the "American rule" of
^^P. Linzer, The Decline of Asset: At-Will Employment
as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 2
Ga.L.Rev. 323, 375 (1986) .
^^H. Wood, supra note 1, at 272-73.
^°Id. at 272.
^^Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 NY 117, 121, 42
N.E. 416, 418 (1895) ("With us the rule is inflexible, that
a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. .
[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the
will of either party, and in this respect there is no
distinction between domestic and other servants").
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8substantive law. Behind the scenes was a transition
from Status, "the servant," to Contract, "the employee."
The at-will doctrine reflected the then laissez fair
economic philosophy in the 19th century. With the coming
of the era of large-scale industry, the attitude of
Government was undoubtedly favorable to the employer,
stressing the freedom of rhe employer to run its business
without interference and encouraging industrial growth. By
enabling the employer to enjoy great discretion over the
employee in the employment relationship, the at-will
doctrine contributed to the entrepreneurship and economic
growth of the era.
The concept of "freedom of contract" was also evolved
from the laissez-faire economic policy. In that age when
large-scale industry was developing at a rapid pace,
workers frequently changed jobs on their own initiative^^
thanks to the historic American shortage of labor. The
policy of vesting employers with maximum freedom to termi-
nate employees probably seemed to the courts an obvious
interpretation of "mutuality of obligations." And so,
"freedom of contract" that the terms of the employment
relationship, like those of other economic relationship,
should be determined entirely by the parties to the
contract without interference from state or federal
^^A. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment
Termination, 66N.C.L.Rev. 631, 641 (1988).
governments^ seemed to the courts an obvious translation
of public policy into the employment sphere. ^'^
B. Movements of Statutory Protections
At the turn of the century, there arose a movement to
call for some protections for employees. The federal and
state governments as well as the public began trying to
correct the inequality of powers between employers and
employees
.
Legislatures carved out exceptions to freedom of
contract running along two distinct lines: first, pro-
tecting collective employee rights, and second, protecting
individual employee rights.
As to the former, social and economic pressures led to
legal developments protecting the economic welfare of
workers; collective bargaining and unionization of employ-
ees created the initial change and the erosion of the
employment at-will doctrine. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of
19322'^ and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935^6 sought
to create an environment in which collective bargaining
would replace individual bargaining for most employees.
^^W. Freedman, The Employment Contract Rights and
Duties of Employers and Employees 13 (Quorum Books 1989)
.
^'^Leonard, supra note 22, at 641. ("Furthermore such a
rule was consistent with the general approach of the courts
toward employment issues").
^^29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1988).
2^29 U.S.C. §§151-169 (1988).
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Acting through a representative of their own choosing,
employees would become their own guardians^' and obtain a
voice in many decisions affecting their working lives such
as wage rates, benefits, working conditions, and job
security. Section 8(a) (3)^^ of the NLRA prohibits an
employer from discriminating in employment in order to
encourage or discourage union membership. The employer's
freedom to discharge employees is curtailed in this
significant respect. Furthermore, most of the unionized
employees can enjoy protection from wrongful discharge
under a "just cause" provision of collective bargaining
agreements .^^
The shift of American labor law in the late 1960 's
from the legislative protection of collective employee
rights to protection of the individual further eroded the
^"^C. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A
Changing of the Guard, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 7, 9 ("The basic
assumption of the N.L.R.A was that the labor market would
be regulated by collective bargaining, not by legislation.
Workers would be protected by their union, not by govern-
ment officials. Workers' rights would be guaranteed by the
collective agreement, not by the law. Those rights would
be defined and enforced through grievance procedures and
arbitration, not through administrative agencies or
courts" )
.
^^§8 (a) (3) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation. . . " ) .
2^See note 13.
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at-will presumption. "Equal Employment Opportunities"
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964^°
protect employees from discriminatory discharge on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Other special purpose statutes prohibit discharge because
of age'^^ or disability ."^^ Retaliatory discharges of employ-
ees exercising their statutory rights have also been
outlawed. ^^
An overview of this legislative history indicates
three general characteristics of the recognition of
employee rights. First, working conditions, particularly
economic interests of the employee, could be encompassed in
collective agreements. Provisions requiring just cause for
discharge seem to be by-products of collective bargaining
rather than primary interests such as wages or benefits.
The second characteristic is that interests protected
by legislation are primarily non-economic interests in
^°§703 (a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2.
^^Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975 (ADEA)
§4 (a), 29 U.S.C. §623 (a) ( 1982 ) . In 1986, the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act was amended to forbid mandatory
retirement based on age, with a few narrow exceptions
pertaining to specified jobs. Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L
No. 99-592, 100 State 3342.
^^The American Disabilities Act of 1990.
2^19 U.S.C. §612(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (ADEA); 29
U.S.C. §158(a) (4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (NLRA) ; 29 U.S.C. §
215(a) (1982 & Supp IV 1986) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. §651 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (OSHA)
.
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fairness, personal dignity, privacy, or physical integ-
rity.'^'^ Most of the federal labor legislation falls in this
category. Protection for substantive and procedural
fairness and justice leads to the democracy of the work
place
.
The interrelation of the collective employee rights
and the individual employee rights is worth discussing.
Since labor legislation regarding individual rights
generally regulates minimum standards of working conditions,
it is desirable for unions to take an important role in
order to further improve those conditions and to create
dependable environment in which both labor and management
abide by the rules with responsibility. Labor legislation
concerning collective rights would function as a comple-
ment to the legislation regarding individual rights.
However, because collective bargaining has failed to take
root as the function of establishing or raising employment
conditions,"^'' statutes which regulate individual rights has
played a significant part in the American employment law.
The third, and the most important, characteristic is
that legislatures and the courts are in a formative phase
to build on an assumption that the employee has a valuable
^''Summers, supra note 27, at 15.
^''See 1 HoFSTRA Law.L.J. 71, at 104 n.l21 (1989) (noting
that 12.9 percent of "all private nonagricultural wage and
salary workers were members of unions .. .while 14.2 percent
(of those same workers) were represented by unions")
.
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interest in his job which ought not to be arbitrarily
taken away."^^ This assumption is the very progressive
attitude toward job security for workers.
36Summers, supra note 21, at 15
CHAPTER III
COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The history of employment law in The United States has
been the history of adding demanded and recognized employee
rights one by one. There is no doubt that the judiciary
has made efforts to respond to the public's desire to see
fairness and justice in the workplace.
Academic criticism of the at-will doctrine, starting
generally in the 1960 's"^"^ along with the felt need of the
public, spurred courts to extend legal theories and to
develop new remedies for at-will employees. By the 1980 's,
the courts of the majority of the states had created some
exceptions to the at-will rule. Judicial developments also
reflect a tendency of courts frequently to alter the common
law rules concerning employment, often looking to decisions
from other states for guidance.
The common law exceptions based on a variety of
perceptions about the inadequacy of the at-will presumption
generally divide into two broad categories: tort and
'^''See, e.g.. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 1404 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges
from Employment : A necessary Change in the Law, 4 Ohio St.
L.J. 1 (1979), etc.
14
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contract. The tort theories of wrongful discharge are
not concerned with the private agreement between the
parties to the employment contract. They rather seek to
vindicate some public policies, found expressly or by
implication in statutes or common law, independent of the
terms of any particular employment contract. The most
common of the tort theories is the public policy exception.
Under the contract theories, courts find legal protec-
tion for employees by enforcing the private terms of their
employment contracts. Breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is rather a sub-category of
suits based on breach of contract. The implied covenant
theory argues that in every contractual arrangement between
parties, the law implies that the parties will deal fairly
and in good faith with one another regardless of whether
there is a written, implied, or oral agreement. This is
consistent with other contract developments, particularly
the provisions of the "Uniform Commercial Code"'^^ and the
"Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "'^^ stating that "every
contract imposes a duty of good faith in its performance . "^°
However, only a few states adopt this rule.'^^
^^U . C . C .
^^RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §90, H 1 (1979).
''Id.
'^'Alaska, California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Montana, and Nevada (Table 1. Chronology of Exceptions to
the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Each of the Fifty
States), A. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal
16
A. Tort Theories
1. Public Policy Exception
The first exception to the employment at-will doctrine
recognized in the United States is based on notions of
public policy, "^^ and the most widely accepted exception has
been the "public policy exception. "^"^ The basis of the
Legislation in the United States, 44 Indus. & Lab.Rel.Rev. 644,
649 (1991)
.
'^^Peterman v. Int. Bhd. of Teamsters , Local 396, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P. 2d. 25 (1959); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Monge v.
BeeheRubher Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A. 2d 549 (1974); Harless
V. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A. 2d 385
(1980), etc.
^^See, Seligman, At-Will Termination: Evaluating
Wrongful Discharge Actions, TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 60,61
("The Public Policy limitation on at-will termination is
the most widely accepted of the new wrongful discharge
causes of action"). See generally. Comment, Guidelines for
a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule:
The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 617 (1981); Note,
Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 Stan.
L.Rev. 153 (1981); Note, Protecting Employees at Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception,
96 Harv. L.Rev. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Public
Policy Exception] ; DeGiuseppe, The Recognition of Public
Policy Exception to the Employment -At -Will Rule. A
Legislative Function? 11 Fordham Urb . L . J . 721 (1983); Note,
Development of the Pablic Policy Exception to the At-Will
Doctrine, 29 Ariz. L.Rev. 295 (1987); Cashman et al
.
,
Employment Law: Minnesota Adopts the Public Policy
Exception to the At-Will Doctrine, 14 Wm Mitchell L.Rev. 210
(1988); but see. Note, The Price of the Public Policy
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exception is the duty of the employer not to fire an
employee for reasons that contravene fundamental principles
of public policy.'" Accordingly, the courts generally
protect three categories of employee conduct:''^ (1)
refusing to engage in illegal activities; (2) exercising a
statutory right or performing a civil obligation; and (3)
reporting criminal conduct to supervisors or outside
agencies
.
In the first category of cases, the most typical ones
are those of employees fired for refusing to give false
testimony at a trial or administrative hearing/^ Typical
was the leading case, Petermann v. Local 396, International
Brotherhood of Teamster s,"^"^ where an employee was fired for
refusing to perjure himself at the command of his employer.
The court held that the public's interest in preventing
perjury was sufficiently great to warrant judicial
Modification of the Terminable At-Will Rule, 34 Lab L.J.
563 (1983)
.
^Public Policy Exception, supra note 43, at 1936,
'^''Some commentators divide the conduct as follows: (1)
refusing to commit an unlawful act; (2) performing an
important public obligation; and (3) exercising a statutory
right or previlege. Id.
''^The nature of the proceedings in which the employee
is asked to testify untruthfully should not affect the
cause of action, i.e., before a state legislative committee,
before a state fair-employment agency, before federal
agencies, etc.
^'174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P. 2d 25 (1959).
intervention/^ A case such as discharge for refusing to
take part in price-fixing schemes, with Petermann at one
extreme, falls into this category.''^
The rationale for protecting these employees appears
to be twofold. First, the courts feel it necessary that
they prohibit employers' illegal conduct in order to
protect the general welfare or the policy evidenced by
penal codes, constitutions, and other statutes. Second,
the courts seemingly permit a cause of action relying on
the widely accepted principle that employees should not be
required to choose between violating a law or becoming
unemployed. ^°
The second category includes discharges for filling
workers' compensation claims, °' refusing to take polygraph
^^Id. at 189, 344 P. 2d at 27.
^^E.g., Tamenny v. Atlantic Righfield Co., 27 Cal . 3d
167, 610 P. 2d 1330, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980); Haigh v.
Matsushita Electric Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1332 (applying
Virginia Law)
.
'^^Winther v. DEC International, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100;
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164
Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P. 2d 1330.
'"^Kelsary v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d, 172, 384 N.E.
2d. 353 (1978); and Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666
S.W.2d. 730 (1983); but rejected in Martin v. Tapley, 360
So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978)
.
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tests, or performing an important civil duty such as
jury service. ^^
Finally, there are situations where the discharge
results from the reporting of improper or criminal
activities of employers or co-workers to superiors or
outside agencies, including the press or government; i.e.,
"whistle-blowing" cases. ^'^ The judicial approaches vary
concerning the protection for whistleblowers . The best
approach would be that employees discharged for reporting
statutory violations be entitled to relief because public
policy clearly favors the exposure of crime, ^'' although no
law compels an employee to step forward to communicate his
suspicions regarding illegal activity. The enactments of
federal whistleblower legislation, including a statute
protecting all government workers, ^^ and state legislation
52^ees V. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P. 2d 512 (1975),
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams ^ Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28,
386 A. 2d 119 (1978)
.
^'^See generally, Malin, Protecting the Whistle Blower,
16 U.Mich. J. L.Ref. 277 (1983); D.Massengill, Whistleblowing
:
Protected Activity or Not?, 15 Empl.Rel. L. J. 4 9 (Summer
1989) ; or The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower
Protection Act and the Conscientious Employee: The
Potential for Federal Statutory Enforcement of the Public
Policy Exception to Employment AT Will, 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. 513
(1990)
.
'^Belline v. K-Mart Corp (CA 7 111) 940 F.2d 184.
5^5 U.S.C.S. §§2 3 02 (b) (8) , and 2 3 02 (b) (9) .
20
including New York laws,^^ are based on the rationale of
protecting whistleblowers
.
2. Definitions of Public Policy
One of the most difficult issues presented in a public
policy case is determining what public policy is. The full
scope of the "public policy" exception, if it is not to be
limited to a state's specific legislative enactments or
even to its judicial decisions, is a remaining question.
The most traditional sources for finding public policy are
the official documents of policy such as federal and state
constitutions and legislative enactments.^''' The Illinois
Supreme Court acknowledged in its landmark decision,
Palmatter v. International Harvest:^^
There is no precise definition of the
term. In general, it can be said
that public policy is what affects
the citizens of the state collective-
ly. It is to be found in the state's
constitution and statutes and, when
they are silent, in its judicial
decisions .^^
The Michigan Supreme Court in Suchodolski readily
accepted that ethical conduct was important but held that a
private code of ethics, such as that for internal auditors.
"^N . Y . Lab . Law §740 (McKinney Supp.1988).
"Leonard, supra note 22, at 659.
•^^85 111. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 878.
'"^Id. at 878.
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did not comprise a "clear public mandate."^" In Schwartz
V. Michigan Sugar Co.,^^ the court declared that an articu-
lation of a clear public mandate is limited to subjects
that have actually been treated by the public, whether by
the legislature, state agencies, or state courts or their
federal equivalent. A majority of the courts adopting
public policy exceptions in general hold the view that a
clearly established public mandate must be found in stat-
utes, regulations or court decisions. ^^ This is "public
policy" in a narrow sense.
On the other hand, courts that adopt a broad defini-
tion of "public policy" theoretically do not require the
^^Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 316
N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982)
.
^^106 Mich.App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 710.
^^See, e.g.. Turner v. Letterhenry Fed. Credit Union,
505 A. 2d 259 (9a. Super. Ct. 1986) (need a clear public
mandate to overcome employment-at-will doctrine) ; or
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 174 Ariz. 370,
710 P. 2d 1023 (1985) (only those statutes, constitutional
law, and judicial decisions will provide the basis for a
wrongful discharge claim). See also, Salazar v. Furr's
Inc., 629 F. Supp . 1403 (1986) (The court rejected the
plaintiff's public policy argument that her dismissal for
being married to an employee of the company's competitor
violated the public policy that encourages family unity and
the maintenence of family discipline. The court said this
was a very broad principle but stated no specific expres-
sion of the alleged public policy. The court found that
plaintiff's asserted public policy was "too amorphous" and
therefore held that she failed to state a claim for wrong-
ful discharge)
.
22
policy in question to be embodied in a specific statute,
authority, or precedent. The broad definition of public
policy may be found in the Cilley decision in New
Hampshire .^"^ Although the plaintiff cited no specific
statute authority or precedent as the source of his
complaint, the Court held that he was entitled to a trial
on his complaint. Saying that "[t]he public policy
contravened by the wrongful discharge can be based on
statutory or non-statutory policy, "^'^ the Court opined that
what all the plaintiff must do in order to maintain an
action for wrongful discharge is to prove he was discharged
because he refused to do something public policy would
condemn or did something public policy would encourage. ^^
New Hampshire is one of the very few states that
adopts the broad definition of public policy and is, as one
might notice, one of the first states to adopt the public
policy exception. ^^ Fewer and fewer courts are willing to
^'^Cilley V. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, 514 A. 2d 818
(1986) (The plaintiff claimed that he was fired for refusing
to lie to the company president to cover for a senior
official then alleged his dismissal constitute wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy)
.
^^Id. at 820.
^^The Court further said that a jury could find that
the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to lie and that
public policy supports truthfulness.
^^Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A. 2d 549 (NH 1974).
In Cilley, the Court cited Monge even though the sweeping
holding in Monge was subsequently narrowed in Cloutier v. A
& P Tea Col, 436 A. 2d 549 (NH 1974)
.
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accept the broad definition for fear that "public poli-
cy" could be found anywhere under such a broad view. Still
other courts treat the whole concept of public policy as
unsuited for judicial application in this context and
instead declare it as a matter to be left to the
legislature .^"^
3. Interrelation Between the Public Policy Exception and
Job Security
It is unlikely that the public policy exception leads
to a drastic modification of the at-will doctrine because
it probably covers only a small percentage of wrongfully
discharged employees. In light of the prevalent narrow
definition of public policy, shrewd employers who know the
public policies of the state and nation as expressed in
their constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions, and
administrative regulations are free from liability. The
public policy exception is not designed to provide all
employees with job security^® but rather to protect the
"public" from employers who break the law. "The public
policy exception has nothing to do with job security. "^^
The fact that a substantial majority of states have adopted
^'^Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 2 93,
488 N.E.2d 86 (1983)
.
^^D. Kornblau, Common Law Remedies for Wrongfully
Discharged Employees, 9 Indus .Rel. L. J. 660, 667 (1987).
''Id.
24
the public policy exceptions that are relatively non-
controversial and even endorsed by some strong defenders of
the at will presumption''''' does not necessarily indicate a
progressive attitude towards job security.
B. Contract Theories
Under contract theories, courts find legal protection
for employees by enforcing the private terms of their
employment contracts. According to the theories, the at-
will presumption may be rebutted by certain employer
actions or statements, written or oral, regarding job
security or termination procedures which are legally bind-
ing contractual obligations.
In Woods' time, master-servant relations rooted in
feudalism were similar to relationships of the family, in
which the servant was only "a protected and restricted
creature of status. "'^^
In the post-Wood period, the industrial revolution
brought "a movement from Status to Contract, "'^^ and it was
settled that the employer-employee relationship was the
product of an agreement between the parties regarding the
nature of work to be performed and terms or conditions of
employment. As such, the employer-employee relationship.
^°Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. Chi. L. Rev. 947, 952-53 (1984) .
''Id.
"^^H. Maine, Ancient Law 165(1964) (emphasis in original
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even though terminable at will, is basically contractual.
Relying upon this contractual nature found especially in
written company policies and procedures, terminated
employees argued with increasing frequency that their
indefinite terms of employment are terminable only for
cause
.
For decades, it has been increasingly common for
employers to promulgate company policies and rules through
the medium of employee handbooks or personnel manuals.
Employers generally regard the handbook as an effective
tool to communicate to all or specific employees about the
company's policies and practices ."^^
Such handbooks usually outline two types of formal
rules: substantive policies governing the employee's job
and employment expectations; and procedual policies dealing
with personnel benefits. They may contain explicit
provisions regarding personnel benefits and human resources,
or they may contain only vague statements .'^'^ Whatever the
'^'it is not, however, always necessary for a company to
prepare such a document
.
'^''Personnel policy has been rejected as part of the
employment contract where it was found that the policy was
nothing more than a mere general expression of goodwill and
optimism for the future. For example, Brown v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp., 295 (E.D.NY. 1960) (the company
president's statement at a meeting of district managers
that the district managers would always be employed is not
to secure life or permanent employment) . See also,
Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo.App. 339, 123 S.W. 86
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form they may take, employees began to assert that prom-
ises and procedures found in documents give rise to some
contractual obligations on the part of the employer.
1. The Traditional Approach
In its literal sense, "breach of contract" in the
employment context means the existence of a formal, written
contract that has been breached. The issue now raised more
frequently is whether documents other than formal contrcts
such as company policies are part of the employment
contract
.
Courts traditionally supported the view that employee
handbooks did not affect the employer's right to discharge
the employee at will. The cases rejecting company policy
as part of the employment contract are premised upon the
absence of meeting of minds, mutuality, consideration, or
def initeness
.
a. Meeting of Minds
The Supreme Court of Kansas' decision in Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co.'^'' exemplifies strict adherence to
the traditional contract requirements. In Johnson, a
policy manual was published and distributed after the
(1909); and Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp
910 (E.D.Mich. 1977)
.
^^220 Kan. 52, 551 P. 2d 779 (1976).
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coininencement of the plaintiff's employment ."^^ Stressing
the unilateral nature of the policy manual, the court wrote
as follows:
"It was only a unilateral expression of company policy
and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by the
parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratui-
ties. Certainly, no meeting of the minds was evidenced by
the [employer's] unilateral act of publishing company
policy. "^^
This rationale was followed by some other jurisdic-
tions.''^ In Darlington v. General Electric, '^^ the
Pennsylvania Superior Court remained faithful to the
rationale expressed in Johnson, refusing to find a contract
based on the plaintiff's job interview and a manual given
him during the interview. The court held that the simple
fact of publishing a manual did not prove the "meeting of
the minds" necessary to the formation of a contract. The
terms of the handbook were not bargained for, hence
unenforceable .^°
^^Jd. at 781.
^^Jd. at 782.
''^E.g. Lieber v. Union Carbide Courp., 511 F. Supp. 562,
564 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (there must be a meeting of the minds
by the parties that the handbook's provisions conferred a
contractual right on the employee)
.
"^^2 Individual Employment Rights Cases 1666 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986)
.
''Id.
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b. Mutuality of Obligation
In addition to citing lack of "meeting of minds" as a
bar to employees' contract claims, some courts have said
that a handbook is not a contract because there is no
"mutuality of obligation."^' In employee handbook cases,
courts have applied the doctrine of mutuality of obligation
that the employer is not bound to employ if the employee is
not bound to continue his employment but is free to quit
his job at any time for any reason. ^^
The view that job security provisions lack enforce-
ability because of the absence of mutuality of obligation
has been widely criticized and rejected by the courts. ^^^
Confusion has resulted most frequently from the word
"mutuality" itself, which connotes symmetry. Since the law
of contract, however, does not require the exchange of
symmetric promises, the doctrine of mutuality of obligation
^'There are at least three discrete mutuality con-
cepts: (1) mutuality of assent; (2) mutuality of remedy;
and (3) mutuality of obligation. The doctrines have been
repeatedly confused by the courts. William J. Holloway &
Michael Leech, Employment Termination Rights and Remedies
53 (2d ed. 1985)
.
^^Hamlen v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 413 So. 2d 800
(Fla, Dist. Ct. App.1982).
^^E.g., Pugh v. See's Candies Inc., 116 Cal App 3d 311
(1981); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458,
443 N.E.2d 441 (1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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cannot be sustained on the basis of symmetry.^ Mutu-
ality of obligation simply requires that both parties give
consideration "in the form of a valid, legal, and binding
promise. "^^ It does not, accordingly, require the exchange
of identical promises.
To summarize, mutuality appears, therefore, to be
merely a form of consideration, and as long as some valid
consideration for a contract is present, mutuality of
obligation, in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is
not essential. ^^
c. The Requirement of Additional Consideration
The contract theory of consideration in employment law
is the single confusing issue. Contract law requires that
consideration be given in exchange for the promiser's offer
in the form of a promise in order to convert that offer
into a binding agreement. The question is what value the
employee must give in exchange for the promises of job
security contained in the handbook.
^Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 54.
''Id.
'^Weiner v. Mcgraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444;
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629.
See also, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d
880,885. Mutuality of obligation is disposed of in one
sentence: "[t]he enforceability of a contract depends,
however, on consideration and not mutuality of obligation."
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Courts taking the traditional contract approach
have answered this question by stating that a promise of
job security must be supported by independent or additional
consideration, consideration other than services to be
rendered, ^^ because work is already being compensated by
wages. This "additional consideration" doctrine appears to
be grounded upon an unstated presumption that a single,
undivided consideration may be bargained for the agreed
equivalent of only one promise. Thus, where services are
made only in consideration of wages or salary, employees
who have not given additional consideration to support
their reliance on the promises in the handbook have usually
been unsuccessful in proving a contract right to these
promises
.
The requirement of additional consideration for a
promise of job security has received increasing criticism.
One reason for judicial disapproval is that several employ-
er promises may be enforced by a single performance by the
employee, thus there is no requirement of a one-to-one
relationship of promises or equivalency of consideration.
^'Some examples of additional consideration include:
the employee's release of a tort claim against the employer,
giving up another job, moving to take another job, forgoing
another job opportunity, and longevity of service. See
Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 47-50.
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The court in Pugh v. See's Candies^ Inc.^^ referred
to the formalistic approach of independent consideration as
follows: "Moreover, while it has sometimes been said that
a promise for continued employment subject to limitation
upon the employer's power of termination must be supported
by some 'independent consideration,' i.e., consideration
other than the services to be rendered, such a rule is
contrary to the general contract principle that courts
should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. (See
Calamari & Perillo, Contracts (wd ed. 1977) §4-3, p. 136.).
'A single and undivided consideration may be bargained for
and given as the agreed equivalent of one promise or of two
promises or of many promises.' (1 Corbin on Contracts ( 1963) §
125, pp. 535-536.) Thus there is no analytical reason why
an employee's promise to render services, or his actual
rendition of services over time, may not support an employ-
er's promise both to pay a particular wage (for example)
and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal . "^^
As the court goes on to explain, where courts view the
employment relationship as the exchange of a set of multi-
ple employer promises, such as promises to pay a particular
wage and to offer some kind of job security, for a single
^^116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917(1981),
appeal after remand (1st Dist) 203 Cal. App. 3d, 743, 250
Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988)
.
''Id.
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consideration by the employee, there is no need to apply
the additional consideration doctrine. ^°
Some Illinois cases illustrate the evolution of the
law of consideration but also exemplify the continuing
struggle with the idea of the requirement of additional
consideration. In Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action
Agency, ^^ the employer adopted a personnel manual, which was
reviewed and accepted by the employees and approved by the
employer's board of directors, four years after the
employee began work. The employee contended that he was
illegally discharged because the discharge procedures set
forth in the manual were not followed. ^'^ The court held
that the manual was enforceable as part of the employment
contract, and the employee was thus illegally discharged. ^^
Carter stands for the proposition that personnel
manuals can be part of an employment contract if two
conditions are met: (1) a manual is a modification of the
contract; and (2) the manual is bargained for or given
independent consideration in the form of the employee's
continuing to work after the manual takes effect.
^°See aJso, Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 4 ("Our
research has not identified any court opinion that
attempted to explain why a promise of a pension is
enforceable but a promise of some kind of job security is
not when both are in exchange for employee services.")
.
^'24 111. App.3d 1056,322 N.E.2d 574 (1974).
^^322 N.E.2d at 575-76.
''Id.
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According to the court, the manual subsequently distrib-
uted was a modification of the existing "at-will employ-
ment" contract^'' and the employee provided independent
consideration to support the second requirement by continu-
ing to work.
In Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technology, ^^ the
court held the manual was not an enforceable contract^^
because two conditions, which the Carter court addressed,
were not met. The Sargent court said: (1) the personnel
manual prescribing the guidelines for the predischarge
hearing was not a modification of any preexisting employ-
ment contract because the plaintiff was given the manual
when he commenced work; and (2) the terms set forth in the
manual were not bargained for and the employee provided no
independent consideration for the predischarge hearing
requirement.^'' Thus, the personnel manual is not part of an
employment contract unless the manual is a modification of
the contract and supported by independent consideration.
The Illinois cases exemplify a different treatment of
services to be rendered. The courts regard commencing work
^''The court also found that the employee's thirty days'
notice before resigning and certain grievance procedures
satisfy mutuality of obligation.
^^78 111. App.3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979).
^^397 N.E.2d at 446.
''Id.
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as no consideration,^^ whereas they regard continuing to
work after a new handbook is approved by employees as a
sufficient independent consideration to make the handbook
binding. The courts should have a specific explanation why
an employee who accepts and commences work from an employer,
who has already promulgated a personnel policy, is consid-
ered not to have bargained for that policy. There must be
good justification for the distinction between continuing
to work and commencing work in these instances.
Having struggled with the traditional treatment of
employment handbooks, as Illinois did, more and more
jurisdictions abandon the requirements of bargain,
mutuality of obligation, and additional consideration in
the employment context. The traditional contract analysis
has revealed its limitations and inadequacy to deal with
the realities of the workplace in the employment context. ^^
The more courts lean toward application of the
traditional treatment of employee handbooks, the more the
approach they take becomes dogmatic. A typical example is
the application of the additional consideration doctrine.
^^Sargent, 397 N.E.2d 446 ( by agreeing to be bound by
the handbook when commencing employment, the employee
"merely agreed to properly perform his required duties and
nothing more"); see also^ Evis v. Continental 111. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. 111. 1984).
^^Courts and commentators to a large extent view the
employment relationship as a unilateral contract, as
opposed to as a bilateral contract.
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The additional consideration doctrine originally comes
from the consideration doctrine in American contract law
that consideration functions as a more objective and
evidentiary proof for the parties' intent. In the employ-
ment context, it is certainly more probable that "the
parties intended a continuing relationship, with limita-
tions upon the employer's dismissal authority, when the
employee has provided some benefit to the employer or
suffer [ed] some detriment, beyond the usual rendition of
service. "^°° Thus, the traditional rule requiring independ-
ent consideration is only a rule of construction, not of
substance; ^°' courts should avoid a mechanical, arbitrary
application of this doctrine in the employment context.
The courts rejecting the additional consideration require-
ments embrace the viewpoint that additional consideration
in order to enforce an employer's promises of job security
is not necessary where it can be determined the parties
intended to be bound by certain terms. A minority of
courts, however, still hold to the additional consideration
doctrine . ^°^
'°°Pugh V. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
324, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981).
^°^Id. at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925.
'"^Indiana and Kentucky are such examples. Murphee v.
Alabama Farm Bureau ins. Co. (Ala 449 So. 2d 1218, Shah v.
General Electric Co. (WD Ky) 697 F. Supp. 946.
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2. The Progressive Approach
Responding to increasing criticism against the
traditional contract analysis in cases dealing with
employee handbooks, more and more jurisdictions in the
1980 's began to reappraise such a formalistic theory and
thus to develop a new, more progressive approach in this
area of law.
a. Unilateral Contract Analysis
A major feature of the progressive courts that find
statements in employee handbooks binding is a willingness
to utilize unilateral contract analysis. "In most of the
cases involving an employer's personnel policy manual, the
document is prepared without any negotiations and is
voluntarily distributed to the employees, "^°^ though it is
not always necessary for the company to prepare such a
document
.
The voluntary nature of the manual shows that it seeks
no return promise from the employees. Thus, the unilateral
contract analysis is perfectly adequate in employment
cases'^'* in which the manual is an offer from the employer
that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract and the
^°^Woolley V. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., (Sup. Ct. of N.J,
1985) 99 N.J. 284, 491 A. 2d 1257, 1267.
'"''"Although unilateral contrct theory may be inappro-
priate for analyzing complex, multi-party transactions, it
has been widely deemed appropriate for employment and
handbbok scenarios." Pratt, Comments at 210.
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performance of services serves as consideration in ex-
change for the employer's promise. '""^ Today, many states
have recognized implied unilateral contracts in the employ-
ment context. ^"^^ This new approach to employment handbook
cases has disposed of the problematic traditional
requirements of independent consideration and mutuality of
obligation.
One seminal case, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, ^^"^ adopted a variation on the unilateral contract
analysis. In this case, which joined two separate cases
with similar but somewhat different circumstances, ^°^
Toussaint claimed that he was orally assured of job
^'^"Id. See generally, M. Petit, Modern Unilateral
Contracts, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 551 (1983) .
^^^See Krueger, supra note 41, at 649 (Table 1.
Chronology of Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine
of the Fifty States)
.
'°M08 Mich. 549, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
lo^Two separate cases are consolidated in Toussaint.
Plaintiffs Toussaint and Ebling, both middle-level managers,
were discharged after serving five and two years for Blue
Cross and Masco Corporation respectively. "Toussaint
testified that he was told he would be with the company 'as
long as I did my job.' Ebling testified that he was told
that if he was ' doing the job' he would not be discharg-
ed. "(292 N.W.2d at 884). Each claimed that he had received
oral assurances at the time of hiring that he would not be
discharged without just or good cause. It should be noted
that Toussaint^ s case is stronger because he was also
handed a manual of the company personnel policies which
reinforced the oral assurances of job security.
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security when hired^°^ and that he was also handed a
"Supervisory Manual" with a pamphlet of "Guidelines" which
contained a "just cause" provision. ^^^
One of the disputes was whether the company policies
regarding job security contained in the Manual and
Guidelines were enforceable as part of Toussaint's employ-
ment contract or mere gratuitous statements of intent.
Relying on established doctrines of contract formation,
Blue Cross contended that separate and distinct conside-
ration other than services should be required in order for
employment contracts to be enforceable . ^^^ The company
adhered to the additional consideration doctrine.
The company also put emphasis on the necessity of
mutuality of obligation in the instant case.'^^ In response
to the idea that courts should inquire into adequacy of
mutuality of obligation, the Supreme Court of Michigan
rejected the idea by saying that the enforceability of a
contract depends on consideration, not on mutuality of
obligation. ^'"^ The court regarded mutuality of obligation
as a legal doctrine unworthy of addressing; "at best it was
synonymous with consideration."^^'' The court in Pugh v.
'°M08 Mich, at 595, 61, 292 N.W.2d at 883, 884, 890
^^°Id. at 638-40, 292 N.W.2d at 903-04.
^^^292 N.W.2d at 885.
'''Id.
'''Id.
^'^Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 89.
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See's Candies^ Inc.^^" also agreed that there is no
requirement of mutuality of obligation if the requirement
of consideration is met.'^^ The concept of mutuality in
employment contract cases is being widely discredited. ^^'^
The most significant issue then concentrates on what
is exchanged between the employer and employee that amounts
to consideration. The Toussaint majority noted as follows:
While an employer need not establish
personnel policies or practice, where
an employer chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them
known to its employees, the employ-
ment relationship is presumably
enhanced. The employer secures an
orderly, cooperative and loyal work
force, and the employee the peace of
mind associated with job security and
the conviction that he will be treat-
ed fairly. ... It is enough that the
employer chooses, presumably in its
own interest, to create an environ-
ment in which the employee believes
that, whatever the personnel policies
and practices, they are established
and official at any give time.
^^^203 Cal. App.3d 743, 250 Cal Rp . 195 (1988).
^^^Id. at 751, 250 Cal. Rp. at 200.
^^'^Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622,
629 (1983) ("we see no merit in the lack of mutuality
argument ); and JVeiner v. Mcgraw-Hill, Inc., N.Y., 443
N.E.2d 441 444 (1982) ("while coextensive promises may
constitute consideration for each other, 'mutuality, ' in
the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary
when a promise receives other valid consideration").
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purport to be fair, and are appli-
ed consistently and uniformly to
each employee. The employer has then
created a situation "instinct with
obligation. "^^^
The majority first states that it is the company that
has created a special environment in which the employee
shall not be discharged without just cause by establishing
personnel policies providing job security, though it is not
forced to do so. The majority opinion then state that
employees' reliance on written assurances of job security
creates a cooperative and loyal workforce, ^^^ which conse-
quently confers a benefit on the employer. Because the
employer has taken that initiative and enjoyed the benefit
of the employees' satisfactory job performance through the
job security promise, ^^° the court finds an implied contract
of just cause discharge that the employer must recognize.
Although majority does not apparently overrule
precedent requiring additional consideration, ^^^ this
approach to enforcement of a promise of job security is at
118408 Mich., at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892
'''Id.
'^^See Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 89-90
("[i]nstead of searching in vain for a reciprocal
commitment from the employee, the court found improved
morale to be the benefit to the employer in exchange for
its job security commitments").
'''Id.
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odds with the formalistic, bargained for exchange view
of contract. ^^^
Noting that Toussaint did not receive the Manual and
Guidelines or even learn of their existence until after he
was hired/''^ the dissent concluded that "no meeting of
minds occurred on the proposition that the defendant's
Manual or Guidelines, or any part of either, would
constitute the plaintiffs employment contract as claim-
g^^.!i24 Hence the dissent regarded preemployment negotia-
tion as a special circumstance, as amounting to the equiva-
lent of consideration, ^^^ while the majority held that no
preemployment negotiation over job security need take
place. ^^^
Indeed, the impact of the Toussaint decision in the
attack on' the traditional contract approach can be proved
by the fact that an impressive number of jurisdictions have
followed Toussaint 's rational in wrongful discharge cases.
'^^Linzer, supra note 18, at 351 ("this is heresy as
far as traditional contract law is concerned").
123408 Mich. 579, 644, 292 N.W.2d at 906 {emphasis
added) . The Majority, however, speaks of Toussaint
receiving manuals at his meeting with the company Treasurer
Id. at 597 n.5, 292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5.
^^^Id. at 646, 292 N.W.2d at 907.
^^'"Id. at 641 n.4, 292 N.W.2d at 904. ("The record
bears no evidence that during Mr. Toussaint 's several
preemployment interviews, any reference was made either to
the Manual or Guidelines.") 292 N.W.2d at 906.
^^^"[A]nd the parties' minds need not meet on the
subject") Id. at n.4, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
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It seems, however, that Toussaint, invoking the idea of
reliance, has made personnel manuals binding through the
use of a promissory estoppel coloring approach rather than
the use of unilateral contract analysis. The Restatement
(Second) of contracts defines promissory estoppel as
follows: " [a] promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of a
promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise . "^^"^
According to the definition, there are four require-
ments: First, there must be a promise; Second, the promise
must be one the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance; Third, the promisee must actually
act or forbear to his detriment; and Fourth, the promise
should be enforced only if injustice otherwise would result.
Justice Ryan in his dissent refers to this point and says
that "[w]hile the plaintiff in [Toussaint] case has not
pleaded a claim of promissory estoppel concerning his
wrongful termination claim, even if one be assumed, the
record before us is without any evidence whatever that
Toussaint relied upon any policy statements contained in
the Supervisory Manual or the Guidelines concerning the
duration of his employment, notice of termination or
entitlement to written or oral warnings prior to
1 07
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90, fl (1979) ,
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termination either as an inducement to become employed
by or to remain in the employment of the defendant . "^"^ It
might be possible to construe the case as that the employer
has received consideration in the form of a "cooperative
and loyal workforce . "^^^ Nevertheless, Toussaint failed to
address the issue of consideration fully, which several
other cases in the last decade have attempted to discuss
more precisely.
The Minnesota Supreme Court of Pine River State Bank v.
Mettile^'^^ contains a review of contract formation. In Pine
River, the bank fired a former employee, Mettille, a loan
officer, and sued him on two notes on which he was in
default. Mettille counterclaimed, alleging that the bank
had breached his employment contract, dismissing him
without cause and in violation of the disciplinary
procedures set forth in the employee handbook. ^^^^ The bank
distributed to all of its employees a printed employee
^^^Toussaint, 408 Mich, at 649, 650, 292 N.W.2d at 908.
The dissent further distinguished job security from
proposes of a bonus, pension benefits, or severance pay
that the employer should reasonably have expected would
induce reliance by the employee in joining or remaining on
the job. Id.
^^^The use of promissory estoppel as a substitute for
consideration is recognized in some cases. E.g.^ Scholtes v.
Signal Delivery Serv. , Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 492 (W.D.Ark.
1982) .
'^°333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
^'^'Id. at 624-25.
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handbook containing specific provisions regarding job
security and disciplinary policy.
The central issue was whether a personnel handbook,
distributed after the plaintiff was hired, can become part
of the employee's contract of employment . ^"^^ In analyzing
the issue, the court recognized the importance of the
discussion concerning the need for the agreement process,
i.e., an offer and an acceptance . ''^'^ This is based on
contract formation that requires an offer, acceptance and
consideration. ^^"^
The court begins its contract analysis by noting that
a handbook can become part of the employment contract if
the requirements for formation of a unilateral contract,
(offer, acceptance, and consideration) are met.^^° To be
more precise, a promise of employment on particular terms
of unspecified duration may create a binding unilateral
contract, if the offer, definite in form, has been communi-
cated to the offeree, the employee, and there has been an
^'^^Id. at 625 {emphasis supplied) .
^^•^Jd. ("Whether a handbook can become part of the
employment contract raises such issues of contract forma-
tion as offer and acceptance and consideration").
^^^utual assent pervades all three contract elements:
offer, acceptance and consideration. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §§3, 5124, 50 & 71 (1979).
^^°Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d at 625,
627.
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acceptance of the offer and consideration furnished for
its enforceability.''^^
In this case, according to the court, the alleged
provisions of the handbook section'"^' do set out in definite
language an offer of a unilateral contract for procedures
to be followed in job termination. This offer was communi-
cated to the employees including respondent, by dissemi-
nation of the handbook. Mettile's continued performance of
his duties, although free to quit, constitutes an accept-
ance of the bank's offer and also supplies the necessary
consideration for that offer. '^^ Hence, procedural re-
straints on termination of employees contained in the
employment handbook were held contractually binding, and
Mettille was wrongfully discharged contrary to those
provisions
.
As to consideration, the court disposed of the idea
that a provision for job security in a contract of in-
definite duration was not binding without additional,
independent consideration other than services to be
performed. '-^^ The independent consideration rule was not
regarded as the exclusive means for creating an enforceable
^^^Id. at 626-27.
^^'^Id. at 630. This portion of the employee handbook
was entitled "Disciplinary Policy." The handbook section
entitled "Job Security", however, was not found definite
enough to constitute any offer. Id.
'''Id.
^'^^Id. at 628-29.
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job security provision; it served, at best, an evident
function.^'"' The gist of Pine Riveras treatment of the
consideration issue is that the court recognized the
employee's continued labor despite his freedom to leave as
sufficient consideration for implied promises . ^''^ The court
also mentioned that it found no need to distinguish hand-
book provisions of job security from those of bonuses,
severance pay or commission rates which were enforced with
a single performance, the continued labor, ^"^^ This approach
seems more plain than the "reasonable expectations"
standard applied by the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint
.
The courts' discussion, as in Pine River, of implied
unilateral promises of job security ranges over several
important subissues. Some of the factors courts consider
necessary to finding that the manual is an implied contract
are as follows: the question of when the manual was given
to the employee, at the time of hire or some time after;
the question of whom the manual was given to and whom it
was intended to cover; and the question of whether and to
^^°Id. at 629. See also, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal . Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
'''^"Despite, her freedom to resign, an employee's labor,
particularly if continued faithfully and satisfactorily
over a reasonable period of time, is ample consideration to
support all of an employer's express or implied promises
including those related to job security." Note, supra note
9, at 1816, 1819-20.
'''Id.
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what extent the employee knew its provisions or of
whether the employee was even aware of its existence.
As to the first question, for the courts in Toussaint
and Pine River, it made no difference whether the manual
was given to the employee at the time of the original
hiring or later, ^''^ The New York Court of Appeals in Weiner
V. McGraw-Hill , Inc.,^'^ however, held job security promises
contained in the handbook enforceable only because they
existed at the time of hiring. ^^^ In the course of dis-
cussions looking towards his joining McGraw-Hill, Inc., the
plaintiff was orally assured of job security as well as a
well-paying position. ^''^ During the course of these
discussions, he signed and submitted the application
specifying that his employment would be subject to the
provisions of the employee handbook prohibiting discharge
^"^^Toussaint, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892. See
also. Pine river, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 and 630 ("We hold,
therefore, that where an employment contract is for an
indefinite duration, such indefiniteness by itself does not
preclude handbook provisions on job security from being
enforceable, whether they are proffered at the time of the
original hiring or later, when the parties have agreed to
be bound therby") {emphasis added)
.
1^57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457, N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982) .
^^''Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197
[emphasis added).
^^^The plaintiff had been working for another publisher,
a competitor, for 4 years when he was invided by McGraw-
Hill to discuss joining it.
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without "just cause." During the eighth year of his
employment, the plaintiff was dismissed allegedly for "lack
of application. "^^'^
In upholding a breach of contract claim, the court
concluded that the plaintiff should be entitled to estab-
lish an implied-in-fact contract obligation not to be
discharged without just cause under certain circumstances
surrounding the employment relationship. The circumstances
the court found essential to state a cause of action
consist of four factual grounds: (1) inducement based on
oral assurances of just cause employment; (2) the assurance
incorporated in the employment application; (3) detrimental
reliance; and (4) the defendant's general enforcement of
its just cause policy. ^'*^ The court found it important that
the job security policy existed at the time of hiring. The
company was bound by the just cause policy, and it received
consideration in the form of the employee's initial and
continued employment or in the form of the employee's
rejecting other offers of employment in reliance on the
policy.
The court also noted that "it is not [an employer's]
subjective intent nor any single act, phrase or other
expression, but 'the totality of all of these, given the
attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and
^^"^57 N.Y.2d at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at
197.
148 Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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the objectives they were striving to attain,' which will
control. "^^^ In the Weiner court's point of view, all the
course of conduct of the parties combined to state a good
cause of action for breach of contract.
Where an employee brings suit for wrongful discharge
in violation of the terms of the handbook, the question of
whether the handbook was intended to cover the employee is
relevant. The New Jersey supreme court in Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche^^^ held that implied promises that it will
discharge employees only for just cause in an employee
handbook distributed by a large employer to its workforce
are enforceable by all the employees.
Woolley, hired as an engineering section head, sued
for breach of contract, complaining that the express and
implied promises in the personnel manual created a contract
underwhich he could not be fired without just cause. ^"''^ In
this company, the manual was generally distributed to
supervisory personnel, however, the court in Woolley placed
great emphasis on the fact that the manual was circulated
^^^Id. at 466-67, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at
198. The court's decision in Weiner has been criticied by
some comentators, "[T]he court's decision was problematic
since the majority merely listed four factors in the record
without providing any indication as to the importance of
any particular fact or mixture of factors." Minda, supra
note 29, at 1145.
'^°99 N.J. 284, 491 A. 2d 1257 (1985).
^^'491 A. 2d at 1258.
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among a substantial number of its employees, who thus
reasonably believed that the provisions should cover not
only a particular class of employees but all employees as
well. ^^2
The court concluded that when an employer of a sub-
stantial number of employees circulates a manual providing
certain benefits such as job security, the judiciary should
construe them in accordance with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the employees . ^°"^ In this point, the Woolley court
adopted the same "reasonable expectations" standard applied
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint . By the
manual's extensive dissemination, in the absence of contra-
dicting evidence, both the reasonable expectations of the
employees to be covered by the provisions and the
employer's intent to apprise all employees of the bene-
fits it conferred were implied. ^^'^ The general rule is that
an employee whom a manual was not intended to cover may not
sue the company for breach of contract based on the manual.
This may be overcome by other circumstantial evidence that
the company intended the manual to apply to all employees
as in Woolley and IVeiner.'"
^'^Id. at 297-98, 491 A. 2d 1264-65.
^'^Id.
^^^See, Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum
Products Co., 3 Individual Employment Rights Cases 336
(Conn. 1987) (the court held that the manual, which was
distributed only to supervisory personnel, was not intended
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The Woolley court clearly characterized the employ-
ment relationship bound by the employee handbook as a
unilateral contract. ^^^ "In most of the cases involving an
employer's personnel policy manual, the document is
prepared without any negotiations and is voluntarily
distributed to the workforce by the employer. It seeks no
return promise from the employees . "^^"^ Thus, the court
concludes that it is reasonable to interpret the manual as
a unilateral offer, '^^ in the form of promise.
In order for a unilateral offer in the form of promise
to be enforceable, it must be accepted and supported by
consideration. ^^^ Several questions arise from analysis
that performance of job duties in response to an employer's
unilateral offer simply satisfies both acceptance and
consideration. Realistically, employees receiving a manual,
reading it, and relying upon the policies would reasonably
expect that those policies will be followed and that they
to cover employees like the plaintiff, who was a non-
managerial marketing representative)
.
'^*^99 N.J. at 301-04, 491 A. 2d at 1267. In a bilateral
contract, however, promise is given in exchange for a
promise rather than for performance. As to the
requirements in a bilateral contract, see the privious
Chapter.
^^^99 N.J.' at 304, 491 A. 2d at 1267.
'''Id.
'^^Unilateral contract analysis views the employment
handbook as an implied contract if the requirements of
offer, acceptance and consideration are met.
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will become the beneficiaries of those policies. With
knowledge of the manual, the employee's continuing work
when free to quit evinces acceptance and consideration. In
that situation, the court's ruling is correct. ^^°
However, would the courts conclude that the continued
work of employees who are unaware of the policies of job
security contained in a handbook evinces both acceptance
and consideration? It seems anomalous to conclude that
employees who are totally unaware of employment terms
providing job security can be expected to respond by being
a "cooperative and loyal work force. "^^^
The majority in Toussaint held that it is un-
necessary that the employee know of the particulars of the
employer's policies and practices .^^^ What seems important
under the court's analysis is the fact that the employer
published the policy for the employees' benefit.^^"^ The
court in Woolley seems to follow Toussaint or even more to
extend the scope of the unilateral contract treatment of
acceptance and consideration.'^''
The Idaho court in Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated
Hospitals^ Inc.^^'" is an opposite example. Citing Woolley,
'^°99 N.J. at 301-04, 491 A. 2d at 1266-68.
''^'Harris, Rutgers L. J. 715, at 732 (1986).
^^^Toussaint, 408 Mich, at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
'''Id.
''^Woolley, 99 N.J. at 304, 491, A. 2d at 1268 n.lO.
'^^1 Individual Employment Rights Cases 1540 (Idaho,
1986)
.
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the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in employee handbook
cases and in the employment relationship, all that is
required as consideration is that the plaintiff continued
to work under the terms of the manual and relied on it.
The court's finding that the handbook constituted a uni-
lateral contract was partly, but indeed, supported by the
plaintiff's testimony that she and other employees read and
relied upon the handbook as creating the terms of her
contract of employment . ^^^
As discussed above, a uniform rule of unilateral
contract analysis has not been established in employee
handbook cases especially where the employee does not know
the particulars or even existence of job security provi-
sions in the handbook. If courts consistently apply the
strict contract formation in contract law requiring an
offer, an acceptance, and consideration, to the employment
cases, they will confront its inherent limitations. In
^^^The fact that the handbook was distributed to
employees and their signatures were required to establish
receipt of the handbook reassured the existence of the
agreement process in this case. One commentator also
argues with the holding of Woolley by indicating that the
"Anthony court [51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A. 2d 762], on which
the Woolley court relied, explicitly required that the
employee know of the offer in order to conclude that
employee reliance would be presumed where an employer makes
promises through its policy statements." Harris, supra
note 161, at 731. ("the supreme court [of Woolley]
neglected to mention this vital point in its own
analysis . " )
.
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order for the offer of job security to be accepted, the
employee needs at least to know of the offer's existence,
not to say its particulars. The courts' analysis of the
benefits of an orderly, cooperative and loyal workforce as
consideration is correct in situations where the employee
knows of the provision. The analysis is rather strained
where the employee does not know of the provision.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that a
promise contained in an employee handbook becomes part of
an employment contract under unilateral contract analysis,
if the following conditions are met: (1) a promise in the
handbook is sufficiently definite to constitute an offer; ^^''
(2) the offer must be communicated to the employee, for
instance, by the dissemination of the handbook; and (3) as
a general rule, the employee who is aware of the policy
accepts the offer and supplies the necessary consideration
by commencing work or continuing to work.
b. Unilateral Alterations to Employee Handbooks and Effect
of Disclaimers
Ironically, erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine
among state courts through handbook exceptions has yielded
some favorable results for employers. Like Toussaint, the
WooUey court held that if the employer, for whatever
^^'^The courts are fairly consistent on this requirement
of definiteness .
55
reason, does not want the manual to be capable of being
construed by the court as a binding contract, "all that
need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position
of an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any
kind by the employer contained in the manual. "^^^ Inserting
such disclaimer language in the handbook is favorable for
employers wishing to avoid being sued based on implied
contract theories.
But situations where employers unilaterally alter
existing employee handbooks are rather problematic. Such
court decisions as in Toussaint and Pine River respectively
referred to the issue of contract modification and stated
that an employer may subsequently and unilaterally change a
handbook provision so as not to be bound by it as a
contract. In Pine River, for example, the court notes that
"[Ijanguage in the handbook itself may reserve discretion
to the employer in certain matters or reserve the right to
amend or modify the handbook provisions . "^^^
It is certainly a wise idea for an employer to review
the contents of an employee handbook and to keep it current
by eliminating outdated, inapplicable rules and adding new
provisions to improve the labor relations environment of
the workplace. In that sense, as the Pine River court
^^^Woolley, 491 A. 2d at 1271.
^^^Pine river, 333 N.W.2d at 627
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mentions, " [u] nilateral contract modification of the
employment contract may be a repetitive process . "^"^^
In reality, however, surveys^'''^ and case histories
suggest that the changes actually made almost always
disfavored the employees; alterations to employee hand-
books from discharge for cause to termination at-will.
Such alterations have great impact especially on employees
of long service, who may be fired soon after such
alterations . ^'^^ Hence, the harsh effects of employer
alteration of handbooks raise a question of whether
detrimental unilateral amendments are effective automati-
cally upon the employee remaining at work.
Only a handful of jurisdictions have considered the
issue of employer alteration of handbooks. Chambers v.
Valley Nat '1 Bank^''^ is one of the cases that has allowed
''^^"A survey conducted in New York State found that
fifty percent of responding companies had recently changed
the language in their handbooks to clarify their employ-
ment-at-will policy." Jack Stieber and Mark D. Baines, The
Michigan Experience with Employment-at-Will, 67 Neb. L. Rev.
140, 171 n.241 (1988)
.
^''^E.g., King v. Hosp. Care Corp., No. 1-85-1 (Ohio App.
may 13, 1986) (Westlaw, Ohio Cts Database) (an employer added
a disclaimer to a handbook with just cause provisions and
soon after fired an employee); Chambers v. Valley nat '
1
Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988) (an employee
with 14 yrs of service was fired soon after a just cause
handbook was disclaimed)
.
1^3721 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Ariz. 1988).
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unilateral modification by employers. In Chambers, the
bank revised its original manual that had contained a
discharge-for-cause provision and disclaimed any obligation
to discharge for cause. The court characterized the
employer's inclusion of a disclaimer in a handbook publish-
ed subsequent to plaintiff's employment as an offer to
modify a unilateral contract, which the plaintiff accepted
by continuing to work.'''''^ This logic is based on the
unilateral contract theory that if an employer's handbook
is specific enough to constitute an offer, an employee's
commencement of work or continuation constitutes both
acceptance and consideration.
One recent case, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,^'^^
also upheld unilateral modifications but on a different
basis. In Banky, a discharged salesman with 13 years of
service filed a complaint, alleging that there existed a
policy that the company would not terminate its employees
without just cause and that he continued to work for the
store in reliance upon that policy. ^"^^ In fact, the company
revised its Digest to eliminate any for cause requirement
for discharge of its employees two months prior to his
'^"•id. at 1131-32. See also, Bookshaw v. South St
Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct . App. 1986)
(stating that if an employer alters existing policies, a
new unilateral contract is offered which the employee
accepts by remaining on the job)
.
'^•M32 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112 (1989).
'''Id.
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termination, ^"^"^ The Michigan Supreme Court held that "an
employer may, without an express reservation of the right
to do so, unilaterally change its written policy from one
to discharge for cause to one of termination at will,
provided that the employer gives affected employees
reasonable notice of the policy change. "^"^^
In analyzing the enforceability of a new policy, this
court finds it inappropriate to apply unilateral contract
theory in this instance.'''^ The court, instead, relies on
"the analysis employed in Toussaint which focused upon the
benefit that accrues to an employer when it establishes
desirable personnel policies . "^^^ The Toussaint analysis
states that an employer who chooses to establish desirable
policies, such as one of discharge-for-cause, is seeking
to promote an environment conductive to collective produc-
tivity. ^^^ The benefit the employer derives by establishing
such policies, (a loyal, productive and cooperative work
force)
,
gives rise to a situation "instinct with an
obligation, "'^^ Thus, when, as in the question before us.
177Id. at 442, 443 N.W,2d at 114
^'^^In re Certified Question {Bankey v. Storer
Broadcasting Co.), 432 Mich, 438, 443 N,W,2d 112 (Mich,
1989)
.
'^^Jd. at 454, 443 N,W,2d at 119 . This court does not
reject the applicability of unilateral contract theory in
other situations.
'''Id.
''^Toussaint, 408 Mich, at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892,
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the employer chooses to revoke its desirable policy, the
employer's benefit is correspondingly extinguished as is
the rationale for the court's enforcement of the dis-
charge-for-cause policy. ^^"^
This notion of mutual injury^^ and the premise that an
employer should certainly retain discretions to change its
policies, when necessary, to correspond to the business'
s
needs underlie the argument permitting unilateral modifi-
cations. On fairness grounds, the court in Bankey required
that reasonable notice be given to the affected employees
for the revocation of a discharge-for-cause policy to
become legally ef fective .^^°
Indeed, as the court notes, a business policy is
generally understood as"a flexible framework for operation-
al guidance, not [as] a perpetual binding contractual
obligation, "'^^ which supports the unilateral amendment of
employment manuals. In this sense, a Missouri court's
statement in Enyeart^^'' may be true that ^'the employer is
'^"^One commentator notes "such changes injure the
employer just as they injure the employee." Pratt, supra
note 15, at 218 n.l37.
^^Id. at 219.
^^^Bankey, 432 Mich, at 456, 443 N.W.2d at 120
("Fairness suggests that a discharge-for-cause policy
announced with flourishes and fanfare at noonday should not
be revoled by a pennywhistle trill at midnight")
.
'''Id.
''"^Enyeart v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120,
123 (Mo.App. 1985)
.
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contractually bound to observe [its] policies until they
are modified or withdrawn. "^^^
Nevertheless, the issue that the employer's change in
policy purported to affect employee benefits secured under
the first handbook must be discussed more carefully. As
one commentator suggests, "issuing a second unilaterally
modified handbook is not the same as issuing the first"^^^
because "the [modified] handbook constitutes an offer to
modify the existing implied contract . "^^° In Bankey, the
unilaterally modified handbook constituted an offer to
modify the existing contract of discharge-for-cause to the
detriment of the employee, one of termination-at-will . The
existence of the legitimate expectations of affected
employees grounded in the discharge-for-cause policy makes
such cases complicated to deal with.
Some foreign jurisdictions have dealt with the issue
of the enforceability of a unilaterally modified handbook
to the detriment of the employee and have advanced rather
restrictive views of its enforceability. The Supreme Court
of Japan held that the employer's change in policy purport-
ing to affect employee benefits already accrued or vested
may be binding only with an absolutely reasonable cause to
alter. '9'
'^^Jd. {emphasis added) .
^^^Pratt, supra note 15, at 221
^®°Jd. [emphasis added) .
1^^1968-12-25 MiNSHU.
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Two English cases held that an employer may uni-
laterally change its employment rules, provided that the
employer gives affected employees reasonable notice of the
rule change . ^^^ Hepple supported the ruling, noting that
the contract may be legally binding based on the principle
of promissory estoppel . ^^'^ Under the principle of promis-
sory estoppel, requiring that reasonable notice of a change
that revokes a discharge-for-cause policy must be uniform-
ly given to affected employees protects legitimate expec-
tations of the employees who worked under this view.
Without reasonable notice or other means to protect the
expectations, employers would be allowed to change their
policies only when absolutely necessary. It would be
doubtful, however, for courts to apply such a reasonable
standard as that of Japan to the cases in which the employ-
er is attempting to alter the handbook from a discharge-
for-cause to one of termination at-will because "the
concept of 'accrued or vested rights [in this country]
cannot be stretched to include the right not to be dis-
charged except for just cause. "^^^
^^^Carus V. Eastwood [1975] I.T. 885 (Q.B.), James v.
Hepworth and Grandage Lt. [1968] I.Q.B. 94 (C.A.).
^^^Hepple, B.A., Employment Law, 4th ed., 1981.
^^"^Ottawa Co. v. Jaklinski, 423 Mich. 1, 26, 377 N.W.2d
668 (1985). "Vested or accrued rights" in Michigan include
as followes: Psutka v. michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich 318,
264 N.W. 385 (1936) (pensions and death benefits); and
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Like Toussaint, the analysis employed in Bankey
seems to be close to the principle of promissory estoppel.
Courts making employee handbooks binding through the use of
promissory estoppel need not search for offer, acceptance,
and consideration; instead, they look for an employee's
reasonable reliance upon statements made by the employer.
The courts simply prefer a promissory estoppel approach in
employee handbook cases, or some of theme may shrink from
unilateral contract approach. ^^'' Although the Banky court
clearly states that the use of unilateral contract theory
is not appropriate in the instant case,^^^ it seems to say
so in order to avoid struggling with contractual obstacles.
In analyzing the enforceability of the unilaterally
modified handbook from one of discharge for cause to one of
termination at-will, the most important factor to which
courts should look is acceptance by affected employees. In
that sense, reasonable notice given to all employees is
useful for a jury to determine that continued work
satisfies both acceptance and consideration. Thus,
assumption that continued work by the employee automati-
cally makes the unilaterally modified handbook binding is
hasty.
Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich 143, 220 N.W.2d 697
(1974) (severance pay)
.
^^^A difference betwee these two approaches lies in
damages. See, Pratt, supra note 15, at 216.
'^^Justice Boyle in his concurring agrees with the
majority. Bankey, supra note 178.
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The applicability of unilateral contract theory in
the above situations should be judged based upon whether
the court pays careful attention to the agreement process
not the mere fact of the employee continuing to work.
Today courts and commentators to a large extent
generally view the employment relationship as a unilateral
contract. Unilateral contract analysis disposes of the
traditional obstacles of bilateral contract and is viewed
as particularly useful, combined with the progressive court
approach to consideration in the employee handbook context.
The history of contract exception cases also reflects
public interests stated in private agreements. The court's
application of contract law in both ordinary handbook cases
and those of modification, however, leaves questions to be
resolved.
C. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
An employee may allege that the employer's action
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied by law in every contract. The idea of implying
such an obligation into employment contracts was extended
from other contract developments, particularly the provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code^^'^ and the Restatement
^^"^U.C.C. §1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement."
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(Second) of Contracts'^® that every contract imposes a duty
of good faith in its performance.
California, for example, has led the way in developing
causes of action to protect at-will employees, first
allowing a contract cause of action, then a tort cause of
action for discharge in violation of public policy, and
also a cause of action for discharge based on breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. California
appellate courts allowed even tort relief for breach of the
implied covenant until the California Supreme Court de-
termined in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. that an employ-
er's breach of the implied covenant is not a tort.'^^
While some courts recognize the rule under certain
circumstances, ^°° most of the jurisdictions still reject a
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant in
employment contracts, arguing that "although there may be
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in other
types of contracts (e.g., sales, insurance, surest, [or]
various commercial transaction) , no such covenant should be
implied in employment contracts, "^°' because an implied
'^^Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205 (1981) provides:
"Every contract imposes uon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
'^^FoJey V. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254
Ca. Rptr. 211, 765 P. 2d 373.
^"^Accompanying text, n.41.
^"'Cerard P. Panaro, Employment Law Manual 8-39 (Warren,
Glrham & Lament, Inc. 1990)
.
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covenant is considered inconsistent with the rule of
employment-at-will . Alternatively, courts argue that any
changes in the area of the employment law should be
accomplished legislatively and not by courts, ^°^
These conditions illustrate several problems: first,
there is no uniform rationale for the theory of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; second, states
vary on what elements the plaintiff must prove to establish
a case; and third, courts do not agree on whether breach of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
strictly a contract action, a tort, or both. Thus, this
type of wrongful discharge suit is probably the weakest and
most complicated of all types of wrongful discharge suits.
1. The Historical Development
Review of the historical development of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing should start with
the New Hampshire Supreme Court case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co.,^^'^ the seminal case on the bad-faith wrongful discharge
cause of action. In Monge, the plaintiff alleged the
employer may be subject to contract damages and compensa-
tory damages for emotional distress for wrongful discharge
on a non statutory claim for sexual harassment on the
2°2panaro, Supra note 14, at 8-38 - 8-40.
203114 NH 130, 316 A. 2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
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job.^^ Reversing the award of compensatory damages, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for
contract damages and held "that a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is
not in the best interest of the economic system or the
public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract. "2°^
Although the court in Monge injected public policy
considerations into the employment relationship and imposed
an obligation on the employer, this case was rather
confusing as it included tort and contract concepts in a
single holding. ^°^ Several years later, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, in Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co.,^^'^ suggested
that New Hampshire was aligned with the majority view that
permitted a public policy exception to the at-will rule and
^"^When the case arose, sexual harrassment as a
violation of Title VII was not generally recognized. The
Supreme Court has only recently held that sexual
harrassment is actionable as unlawful discrimination on the
basis of sex. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, All U.S. 57,
63-68 (1986)
.
^^'""Monge 114 NH at 132, 316 A. 2d at 551.
^°^Lucy A. Singer, Employment -at -Will and the Aftermath
of Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 34 Saint Louis L.J. 695,
703 (1990) . See also, Tom May, The covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing: A Common Ground for the Torts of Wrongful
Discharge from Employment, 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1111, 1157
(1981)
.
^°^120 NH 295, 414 A. 2d 1273 (1980) .
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that it did not intend in Monge break new ground on a
bad-faith theory, A year later, the court in Cloutier^'^^
reconciled these two cases and articu-lated a two-part
test^°^ to apply in wrongful discharge cases alleging bad
faith.
Despite New Hampshire's retreat, several courts began
to apply the bad-faith theory to wrongful discharge cases
on the rationale of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The first case following Monge on this bases
was a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.^^'^ Fortune, an
employee of National Cash Register as a regional salesman,
was fired to prevent the vesting of certain commission
rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held that: (1) even
though the salesman's contract was terminable at will,
there was an implied covenant of good faith in the
contract; and (2) evidence supported the determination that
the employer had discharged the salesman in order to avoid
^°^Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 121 NH
915, 436 A. 2d 1140 (1980)
.
209mjj-^ order to recover damages, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was motivated by bad faith, malice,
or retaliation in terminating the plaintiff's employment;
in addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the firing
was because of the performance of an act that public policy
encouraged or the refusal to perform an act that public
policy condemned."
2i°373 Mass 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) .
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paying certain bonuses to the salesman, ^^' hence breach of
the covenant. Recognizing the general requirement in law
"that parties to contracts and commercial transactions must
act in good faith toward one another"^^^ and the existence
of this duty in the contract, however, the court found it
unnecessary to reach the question as to whether all
employment contracts contained a duty of good faith and
fair dealing. ^^"^ The New Hampshire and Massachusetts courts
have shied away from a broad incorporation and adopted
instead more limited exceptions.''^
One of the influential decisions involving the duty of
good faith and fair dealing is Cleary v. American
Airiines.^'° In Cleary, a plaintiff with 18 years' seniori-
ty who was discharged for alleged theft, brought suit on a
contract theory, arguing that the due process guaranteed in
the handbook and a general duty of good faith and fair
dealing were not followed. ^'^ A California court of appeals
2''364 N.E.2d 1256
^^^Id. at 1257.
214r
'The New Hampshire court limited Monge to discharges
that violate the usual public policy exception standard.
[See Haward, 120 N.H. at 297) . In Massachusetts, the
implied covenant was applied only in cases in which
employees lost "identifiable, reasonably anticipated future
compensation, based on . . . past services" because of a
discharge without cause. (Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Col.,
384 Mass. 659, 660, 429 N.E.2d 21, 22 (1980)).
^'^lll Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal . Rptr. 722 (1980).
^^^Id. at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
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held that the longevity of the employee's service could
provide a basis for finding a violation of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. ^^'^ The court focused on Cleary's
eighteen years of apparently satisfactory performance as
the basis for an implied-in law requirement that employers
can discharge long-term employees only in good faith. ^'^
As to the proper remedy, the New Hampshire court in
Monge rejected damages for pain and suffering. ^^^ The
Cleary court, however, stated that the employer's breach of
the covenant "sounded in both contract and in tort"^^° and
that " [the discharged employee] will then be entitled to an
award of compensatory damages, and in addition, punitive
damages if his proof complies with the reguirements for
[punitive] damages. "^^^ The Montana court in Gates v. Life
of Montana Insurance Co.,^'^^ while rejecting the plaintiff's
^^'^Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
^'^Leonard, supra note 22, at 655 (noting while
longevity of service, by itself provides a basis for
finding a violation of "the duty of good faith and fair
dealing", the promulgation of a handboolc policy is evidence
of the employer's recognition of such an obligation).
2i^Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A. 2d at 551.
^^°Cleary, 111 Cal. App.3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
729.
221 Jd.
222196 Mont. 176, 638 P. 2d 1063 (1982), [hereinafter
Gates I] appeal from decision on remand, 205 Mont. 304, 668
P. 2d 213 (1983) [hereinafter Gates II].
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express contract claim based on the handbook, ^^-^ found
that the employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing was
implied in the employment contract. ^^^
In Gates II, the court held that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing was implied by law, "apart from, and
in addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties. "^^^ The
breach of the duty sounds in tort and supports an award of
punitive damages if the employer acted with oppression,
fraud, or malice. ^^^
2. The Foley Decision
Several years later, the California Supreme Court
issued its long-awaited decision in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corporation.'^^'^ The court, against the continuing
trend toward recognition of an award of tort damages,
refused to extend tort remedies to employment relationships
based on the duty of good faith and fair dealing. ^^^ Foley,
with over six years of satisfactory performance, was fired
after reporting to an another supervisor that his immediate
superior was under an FBI investigation for suspected
^^^The employer issued a handbook two years after the
plaintiff was hired.
^^^Gates I, 638 P. 2d at 1067.
^^'Gates II, 668 P. 2d at 214.
226 j^^
22'47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal . Rptr. 211, 765 P. 2d 373
(1988) .
228765 P. 2d. at 396.
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embezzlement .^^^ Foley brought three causes of action
against his former employer: (1) a tort cause of action
alleging a discharge in violation of public policy; (2) a
contract cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact
promise to discharge only for good cause; and (3) a tort
cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. ^"^^
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that
"tort remedies are not available for breach of the implied
covenant in an employment contract to employees who allege
they have been discharge in violation of the covenant . "^"^^
The Foley court began its discussion of this issue by
addressing the distinction between contract and tort causes
of action. The court emphasized the importance of predict-
ability of contract damages in the commercial system as
well as the purpose of contract damages to compensate the
injured party, rather than to punish the breaching party. ^^^
Recognizing the premise that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing applies to every contract, however,
the court suggested that since it is a contract term,
remedy for its breach should be limited to contract
remedies .^^^
229765 P. 2d at 375
23° Jd. at 374.
23ijd. at 396.
232id. at 389.
233 Id.
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The court then distinguished the insurance cases,
where tort damages are allowed for breach of the implied
covenant, from general employment contract cases. The
court found that the "special relationship" between insurer
and insured^-^^ is not analogous to the relationship between
employer and employee. The special relationship in
insurance contracts involves parties in unequal bargaining
positions, where one party is seeking security as opposed
to profit, and the weaker party must trust the stronger
party. ^"^^ The court found these factors are not present to
the same degree in the employer-employee relationship. ^"^^
The court reached the conclusion based primarily on
three arguments. First, if an insurer in bad faith refuses
to pay a claim, i.e., breaches the contract, "the insured
cannot turn to the marketplace"^^"^ to obtain the same amount
of what he was deprived. If an employer discharges an
employee for a bad reason, he still maintains the
23^ Jd. at 390-91.
^^Various forms of insurer misconduct were identified
as torts. Among those cases, the court in Egan v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co. {24 Cal.3d 809 (1979)) emphasized that
"the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently
unbalanced; the adhesive nature of insurance contracts
places the insurer in a superior bargining position. "( Jd.
at 820) . This so-called "special relationship" model has
been reiterated in the discussion of tort remedies in the
employment context.
^^^Id. at 396.
'''Id.
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opportunity to seek alternative employment. Second,
"the role of the employer differs from that of the 'quasi-
public' insurance company with whom individuals contract
specifically in order to obtain protection from potential
specified economic harm."^^^ Third, the interests of the
insurer and insured are always at odds. If the insured
makes a valid claim, the insurer loses financially. On the
contrary, the employer's and employee's interests are
generally in alignment. While the employer must pay the
employee for the work done, the employer receives the
benefit of the work in exchange for the payment. Since a
"special relationship, " which gives rise to tort remedies
in insurance cases, does not exist in employment relations,
the court judged that it was unnecessary to extend tort
remedies to discharged employees based on the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The question as to whether the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is implied-in-law or implied-
in-fact is answered in the Foley decision. The court
states that "an allegation of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an allegation of
breach of an 'ex contracts' obligation, namely one arising
out of the contract itself. The covenant of good faith is
read into contracts in order to protect the express
covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some
238Id.
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general public policy interest not directly tied to the
contract's purposes . "^^^
In Gates II, the existence of an employment contract
also led the dissenters to conclude that the employer's
breach of the covenant sounded in contract.
Judicial reluctance by the majority of courts to
extend the duty of good faith and fair dealing to the
employment context may derive from "the poor fit of
employment agreements with commercial contract doctrines"^^^
and from the contradiction that the covenant would impose
on at-will employers, who enjoy the right to fire employees
at-will, i.e., in bad faith.
Even the decisions recognizing the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment context leave questions
to be resolved, including the nature and scope of its duty:
"[w]hen the duty applies, does it require discharges to be
made merely in subjective good faith?; [o]r must an employ-
er have some objective good cause to fire an employee to
whom he owns the implied-in-law duty?"^^' A narrow formula-
tion would only require the good faith duty, while the
broadest extension requires that the employer faithfully
discharge the employee based on "good cause." In employ-
ment contract cases without written or oral implied job
security provisions, it is unlikely for the broadest
239765 P. 2d at 394.
2^°Leonard, supra note 22, at 656.
^'^^Kornblau, supra note 68, at 688
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extension to have a prevailing effect. The covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, therefore, remains only a
limited exception to the at-will doctrine.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING WHY AND HOW JOB SECURITY
SHOULD BE PROTECTED
Job security became a matter of increased concern for
unions, workers, and society during the past decades. The
trend may be traced back to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967,^^^ and several "whistleblower" statutes, all of which
protect certain groups of employees from retaliatory
discrimination or discharge by employers. Common-law
development of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine, a
doctrine that reflected the laissez fair economic philos-
ophy, also indicated increased recognition of fairness to
employees as good ethics in the workplace as well as good
business
.
The felt need to protect employees' rights in the
workplace spurred courts to develop legal theories and
remedies. The Wooley court, recognizing importance of job
security, clearly states that "[w]ages, promotions, condi-
tions of work, hours of work, all of those take second
place to job security, for without that all other benefits
^^^5ee supra note 2-3 and accompanying text.
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are vulnerable . "^^^ The court goes on to explain that job
security is the assurance of the employee's livelihood and
of the employer's family' future, which thus will not be
destroyed arbitrarily by the employer without just cause. ^"^
"Discharge" is indeed labeled as the capital punish-
ment of the industrial world. The issue of job security
has been addressed with increased frequency by indus-
trialized countries in the post World War II period. ^"^^ The
International Labor Organization recommended at the
conventions in 1963 and particularly in 1982 that workers
not be terminated except for good cause. ^^^
Today, about 61 countries around the world provide
workers with protection against unfair discharge by
statutes or through some other measures. ^^' For example, in
Britain, protection against "unfair" discharge is provided
by legislation, as is also true in Sweden. In Germany,
dismissals may only be instituted where their causes belong
to one of the socially warranted exceptions listed in the
^"^^Woolley, 491 A. 2d at 1266.
2^^Gould IV, supra note 8, at 28.
^^^Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
employer, International Labour Conference, 68th Session,
Reports V(l) & (2) (1982)
.
^'''^Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates : Unjust
Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 56,
68 (1988) .
Act on Dismissal Protection of 1951.^^^ In Japan, where
there is no wrongful discharge legislation, the Civil Code
prohibits both disciplinary and economic discharges which
constitute an "abuse" of power. ^'*^ As opposed to the
universal appeal of job security, the United States remains
the last major industrial country that has not heeded the
call for an overall unjust discharge reform. ^^°
Abandonment of the at-will presumption has been
advocated by a number of legal scholars and judges. This
Comment also supports the argument that the at-will
doctrine must be abandoned in order to secure job security
for employees in the workplace. This is not to state that
all discretion employers possess in making decisions
regarding discharge should be limited. This is to argue
against any rationale that suggests the at-will doctrine is
the substantive backgroud rule of law.
A. Reasons for /Abandoning the At-Will Doctrine
1. Socioeconomic Justifications
The employment-at-will doctrine was a creature of an
era in which the primary function of the common law was to
promote industrial growth. Employment-at-will was
2^^The Act has been amended for several times. See
also, M. Weiss, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the Federal
Republic of Germany 3 9-103 (1987).
24^Sugeno, K., Labour Law, 2nd ed. , 343-63, 1990.
^^°Antoine, supra note 247, at 68.
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appropriate for nineteenth-century 7\merica in that the
doctrine giving employers total freedom to discharge
employees at-will served evidentiary purposes to protect
developing industry and the capitalist's investment.
The doctrine is not appropriate for the 1990 's, in
which sophisticated American businesses should no longer
need judicial protection at the expense of justice and
fairness to employees in the workplace. The promotion of
industrial capitalism by the courts has already been
achieved. The California court in Cieary notes that "when
viewed in the context of present-day economic reality and
the joint reasonable expectations of employers and their
employees, the 'freedom' bestowed by [the at-will doctrine]
may indeed be fictional . "^"^
As commentators argue that the at-will rule is
incompatible with the realities of modern economics and
employment practices, the economic and socioeconomic
justifications for the rule no longer exist. Calling for
abandonment of the at-will rule and adaption of a rule more
protective of employee interests in job security is
consistent with the trend toward justice in the workplace
and the tendency of the courts' recognition of various
exceptions to the doctrine.
^'^Cleary, 111 Cal. App . 3d at 449-50, 168 Cal . Rptr.
at 725.
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2. Justifications Against Economic Arguments
A primary purpose of private companies is the pursuit
of profits. Based on that premise, employers enjoy
flexibility in job arrangements so that business will not
lose out in "competitiveness" in the market. But abandon-
ment of the at-will presumption requires only fairness and
job security for employees in the workplace; it does not
require keeping unproductive employees. Without the at-
will presumption, employers can still enjoy the right to
discharge employees through reasonable procedures and just
cause standards. Employees, on the other hand, would still
have to meet reasonable standards of performance if they
expect to be guaranteed continued employment.
Job security under the Japanese system has been often
referred to as "lifetime" employment. It should be noted
that lifetime employment does not mean, however, that all
employees are guaranteed continued employment until their
retirement age. It merely means that employers' discre-
tion to terminate employees are strongly limited by the
"abuse of power" test. Japanese employers usually make
utmost efforts to keep employees, through such measures as
shukkd^'^^ (temporary transfer to a subsidiary firm) , and job
rotation during an economic slump. ^''"^
^^^This so-called shukko or temporary transfer is one
of the Japanese employment practices. The origin of this
system goes back to the pre-war period. It was widely
prevalent in private enterprises after the end of World War
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As to job performance of employees, Japanese em-
ployers have a strong incentive to improve the quality of
their hiring process, management, and supervision of their
workforces. It should be noted that the employers are not
forced to keep unproductive employees; an employer's
discharge decisions may be sustained when dismissals are
based on "just cause," not on the "abuse of power." That
most of the industrialized countries have already provided
some measures of job security through legislation or
standard practice proves that the abandonment of the at-
will rule would not be detrimental to profitability and
competitiveness of American businesses.
Another economic argument in support of maintaining
the at-will doctrine is that "[t]o extend job security to
nonunionized private employments, however, would be to make
all the wider the chasm between employment and unemployment,
and to make more difficult entry into protected employ-
ments."^"'' Professor Power goes on to mention that "the
just cause rule would be an improvement in an era of
economic expansion, abundant job opportunities and near
II. Today many Japanese companies have a provision stating
that "company may order employee to transfer to a subsidi-
ary company."
^^^Joji Akita, Employment Practices Versus Contract in
Japanese Firms, 39 Syakairodokenkyu 322, 1992.
^^''Richard W. Power, A Defense of the Employment At
Will Rule, 27 St. Louis U.L.J. 881, 893 (1983).
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full employment . "^^^ He explains that job security,
particularly in an era of economic stagnation, becomes the
big hurdle which prevents even talented young people from
entering into job markets. ^^^ Amid recession, employers
under the at-will rule are likely to eliminate redundant
employees or employees whom they just dislike or think
unfit. On the other hand, they are unlikely to hire new
employees, which raises the unemployment rate and hence
makes the chasm between employment and unemployment wider.
If, as he states, employers discharged unfit employees and
instead hired new talented people, it would not be likely
that "[the discharged employees] will find employment more
suitable to their talents and temperaments elsewhere"^""^
under harsh economic conditions. The argument that the
just cause rule would be inappropriate in an era of
economic slump is not persuasive at all.
Job security might be a major consideration as
distressed businesses try to make themselves leaner. Even
in Japan where job security has been the hallmark of the
Japanese employment system, a growing number of companies
have moved to shed surplus workers. The latest report from
the Japanese Labor Ministry says as many as 40 percent of
firms are making employment adjustments in one way or
255 j^^
2^^Jd. at 894.
'''Id.
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another, amid the worst recession of the post-war
period. ^^^
The right way to deal with redundant workers would be
to make better use of them, not to get rid of them outright.
Where employers have to eliminate excess employees due to
economic reasons, the just cause rule should only allow
them to do so under certain circumstances .^^^
3. Benefit Justifications
The third argument in support of abandoning the at-
will rule is that the at-will premise allowing arbitrary
discharge creates severe emotional and financial hardships
for employees, which is also detrimental to the long-run
success of a business. Regarding effects of social and
emotional traumas due to discharge, one court stated as
follows
:
Every man's employment is of utmost
importance to him. It occupies his
time, his talents, and his thoughts.
It controls his economic destiny.
It is the means by which he feeds his
family and provides for their security.
It bears upon his personal well-being,
his mental and physical health. In
days gone by, a man's occupation
literally gave him his name. Even
today, a continuous and asecure
2^^The Japan Times/ Monday Oct. 4, 1993 Editorial P18.
^^^This issue will be discussed in the following
Chapter.
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employment contributes to a sense of
identity for most people. ^^°
Job security provides both employees and employers
with a multitude of benefits.^^' Employees' expectations of
not being discharged arbitrarily and not being treated
unfairly in the workplace improve employee morale, satis-
faction, self-esteem and loyalty to the employer and also
foster "employee identification with the goals of the
enterprise . "^^^ The benefits from loyalty and the cost
savings from lower turnover improve productivity of the
company in the long run. Some studies of worker partici-
pation projects prove the theory that productivity often
improves with increased job security and a cooperative
employer-employee atmosphere .^^"^ Indeed, employees appre-
ciate their employers' efforts to eliminate wrongful
discharge and unfair treatment in the workplace.
Accordingly, the atmosphere becomes more favorable and
cooperative to the employer. Incidentally, job candidates
may find assurance of job security as an attractive factor
when deciding whether to accept employment.
^^°Lowe V. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 705,
389 Mich. 123, 205 N.W.2d 167 (1973).
^^^Clare Jully, Challenging the Employment -At -Will
Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 J. L. Reform 449,
451-55.
^^^Minda, supra note 10, at 117 9.
^^^Note, supra note 9, at 1835 n.l02.
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Some commentators have rejected the hypothesis that
job security actually may increase worker productivity and
efficiency by improving morale, loyalty and job satis-
faction, arguing that no evidence that a system of just
cause dismissal would improve worker output has ever been
offered in support of "the satisfaction-productivity
hypothesis . "^^"^ According to their argument, job satis-
faction and motivation are different; "[the former] often
results from factors extrinsic to the job itself such as
pay, benefits, or working conditions [while the latter]
results chiefly from intrinsic factors such as responsi-
bility, recognition, involvement in decisionmaking, or a
sense of achievement or self-esteem." Thus, regarding job
security as one of the extrinsic factors, they conclude
that job security cannot be relied on to motivate employees
to increase their productivity .^^^
This logic seems perfunctory. Job security provides
employees with material and morale benefits. Job satis-
faction and motivation are not separable as in argument
above; employees who find their jobs responsible, chal-
lenging or satisfactory to their self-esteem, would be
reasonably motivated to increase their productivity. As
^^'^Fred & Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 Emory L.J. 1097, 1132 (1989) (noting
that a close examination of the satisfaction-productivity
hypothesis demonstrates its many questionable assump-
tions . "
)
265 j^^
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such, motivation is basically or partially derived from
job satisfaction. Thus job security may be regarded as a
substantial element of job satisfaction, the same as pay,
various benefits or other working conditions. It also
plays an important role in the workplace as it increases
the motivation of many workers who think their employers
are reliable.
The argument that "job satisfaction, or morale, has
virtually no causal impact on job performance, "^^^ and thus
confers no economic benefits on the employer is not
persuasive at all. Job security provides employees with
material and morale benefits, unlike the at-will premise
which always imposes a fear of being discharged arbitrarily
and being treated unfairly upon employees.
The leading defender of the at-will rule. Professor
Epstein, ^^' has argued that the employment at-will rule is
superior to all other alternatives because it is mutually
benef icial^^^ to the parties and consistent with the concept
of "freedom of contract . "^^^ His theory of mutual benefit
is based on the idea of symmetry. He argues that the at-
will rule is fair because it respects the right of both the
employer and the employee to decide when the relation
should be terminated. Professor Epstein's theory fails to
^^^Id. at 1133.
^^"^See, Epstein, supra note 70
^^^Id. at 955-62.
^^^Id. at 953-55.
account for the realities of the workplace in which
employers and employees have unequal bargaining power.
Congress rebutted the assumption of equal bargaining power
between employer and employee by enacting the National
Labor Relations Act. The assumption of asymmetrical
bargaining power has dominated labor law for the last fifty
years and has also motivated courts to recognize several
exceptions to the at-will doctrine .^"^"^ Thus, the mutually
beneficial argument is anachronistic.
The concept of freedom of contract in the employment
relationship, rooted in feudalism and the laissez-fair
economy, has been drastically transformed by society's
recognition that "many aspects of the employment relation
have too many external ramifications to be left entirely to
a private bargain between an employer and an individual
employee . "^'^' Thus the argument is also inconsistent with
the history of employment law, which has witnessed the
circumscription of freedom of contract in the employment
relationship
.
Today, the majority of state courts recognize tort-
and contract-law exceptions to the at-will premise, and one
state, Montana, has replaced the doctrine with a general
just cause dismissal statute. An increasing volume of
wrongful discharge litigation brought by arbitrarily
^'°Minda, supra note 10, at 1170 n.ll6
^''^Leonard, supra note 22, at 675.
discharged employees reflects today's American society;
more and more employees' expectations of job security
continue to expand, as does the growing recognition of how
unjust discharge affects economic well-being and causes
psychological harm.
Now is the time to call for abolition of the at-will
doctrine supported by the social, economy, and moral
rationales and to provide comprehensive legal protection
against unjust discharge for all employees, including those
who are note protected by collective bargaining agreements
or by anti-discrimination legislation, civil service, or
teacher tenure arrangements.
B. Search for the Best Way to Provide Job Security
Commentators opposed to the at-will doctrine have been
confronting another issue. What would be, then, the best
solution to replace the doctrine: increased unionization to
negotiate collective agreements on their behalf; increasing
the existing common law exceptions to the at-will premise;
or adopting state or federal just cause dismissal statutes?
Although each of these solutions has its own limitations
and effects, this article finds unionism and judicially
created exceptions to the at-will rule inadequate to
protect aii American workers from wrongful discharge. This
advocates that the third type of solution; i . e ., legislation
proscribing all discharges without just cause. Particularly,
89
comprehenseive federal legislation is the appropriate
remedy for the issue of wrongful discharge.
1. Unions
Labor unions have succeeded in obtaining a just cause
standard for employment discharge in most collective
bargaining agreements .^"^^ Thus, unionized employees in the
private sector are shielded from unjust discharge by
collective bargaining agreements and are protected much
more than nonunionized employees. The reality is, however,
that such agreements cover only a small portion of the work
force due to the declining union penetration. Unions
represent less than twenty percent of American workers,
which is the lowest level since the end of World War II.
There are some commentators who advocate that employ-
ees wishing to obtain meaningful protection from unjust
dismissal must look primarily to the collective bargaining
process, not to judicial or legislative action to change
the at-will rule.^'^'^ According to this argument, the
problem of job security is so amenable to private provision
^^^A.Cox.D.Bok & Gorman, labor Law 701-02 (10th ed.
1986); 2 Collective Bargaining Negot, & Cont (BNA) §40:1, §
51:1 (1986) (the just cause standard and greivance/ arbi-
tration procedures found in 94% and 97-100% of contracts
sampled respectively)
.
^'''^Susan L. Catler, The Case Against Proposals to
Eliminate the Employment At Will Rule, 5 Indus .Rel. L. J. 471
(1983)
.
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that government regulation should be limited to ensuring
judicial recognition of a public policy exception and to
facilitating bargaining procedures .^'^'^ The argument con-
cludes that employees could insure continued job security
by organizing themselves if they valued job security
highly. ^^"^ Thus, those who could be protected through
organization do not need legislative or judicial modifi-
cation of the at-will rule.^"^^ Theoretically, the primary
purpose of collective bargaining was to protect individ-
ual employee rights, achieving industrial democracy by
giving employees a voice in influential decisions in their
lives and minimizing governmental and judicial interven-
tions.^'^'' The purposes themselves were sound and were
achieved when the interests protected were primarily
economic, which were common to everyone.
A limitation of collective bargainings exists, however,
in that an individual employee cannot enjoy the benefits of
collective bargaining unless a majority of his fellow
employees share the same desire for collective represen-
tation. To be sure, collective agreements have established
not only wage rates but also other defined rights of
employees in the work place. Collective bargaining really
functions where the majority of employees desire equivalent
"^Catler, supra note 273, at 521.
'''Id.
'''Id.
^''"^Summers, supra note 27, at 8-11
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protection, regardless of economic or non-economic
interests. As interests of workers extended to more
personal, non-economic interests such as the rights of
privacy, personal dignity, fairness, and physical integ-
rity, ^'^^ the felt need to protect such individual employees'
rights in the workplace spurred courts and legislatures to
develop new remedies for employees. As a result, protec-
tion by collective bargaining became less attractive.
This decreasing reliance on collective bargaining
means that more than 801 of private American workers are
not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The
decline of unionization seems to be continuing. ^"^^ In light
of the disappointing reality, collective bargaining, with
its arbitration and grievance procedure, may be a sound way
to achieve worker protection from unjust dismissal but
fails to function as an effective instrument for protecting
individual employee job security for most American
workers .^^°
2 . Common Law
2^«Id. at 15.
^'^^ichell. The Changing American Workplace, The Lab. Law.
301, 319 (1985)
.
^^"interestingly, Japanese manegerial and supervisory
employees who have not been covered by collective
bargaining agreements are willing to organize themselves in
order to protect their employment., Takenori Inoki, Nihhon-
Keizai Times, March 29. 1993.
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If collective bargaining does not fully protect
private employees, the law will find other ways to protect
them. Some commentators believe that the judiciary holds
the best promise for doing away with the at-will doc-
trine. ^^^ Professor Blades urges courts to develop tort
theories for "abusive" discharge. "[T]he aff[ected]
employee [should have] a personal remedy for any damage he
suffers when discharged as a result of resisting his
employer's attempt to intimidate or coerce him in a way
which bears no reasonable relationship to the employ-
ment. "^^^ In keeping with the tort formulation of this
cause of action, he suggests punitive damages would be
available to aggrieved employees .^^~^
Professor Leonard urges courts to construct a new
common-law presumption that would more accurately reflect
the contemporary employment law setting. ^^^ This presump-
tion places a great deal of emphasis, far more than found
in present handbook-as-contract cases, on circumstances
that exist when employees enter into the employment
relationship. If the parties have expressed themselves on
the issue of a continuing relationship during the hiring
process, courts should presume that the relation is not at
2^^Leonard, supra note 22, at 680-83 (N.C.), and see 16
J. OF L. Reform., 333.
^^^Blades, supra note 37, at 1413 n.4.
^^^Id. at 1427.
^^Leonard, supra note 22, at 680.
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will. "The more care the employer puts into the hiring
process, such as interviewing, checking references,
administering preemployment physical examinations, and
specifying a probationary period, the more logical would be
the presumption that the employer and the employee expected
the relationship to be extended. "^^^
When the employer has made an express promise by
providing a printed policy manual including a just-cause
provision, the presumption is even more soundly based in
fact.^^^ If the parties have not expressed themselves on
the subject during the hiring process, courts should
presume the employment relationship to be open-ended,
unless the job does not exist or the employee proves
unsuitable for the job.^^"^ He notes that it is reasonable
to acknowledge that deferred compensation such as health
care and retirement benefits, and holiday and vacation
benefits are included in a relationship presumed to be of
indefinite duration, and terminable only for just cause. ^^^
His theory is primarily based on the indicia of the
unspoken understanding that the parties expect their
relationship to be continuous so long as the job is
satisfactorily performed.
^^'"Id. at 681
286 j^_
^^'Id. at 682
^^^Id. at 681
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Professor Blackburn's proposal is similar to that
of Professor Leonard, advocating contract formation as the
proper way for change. He urges courts to cease inferring
that parties intend employment to be terminable at will.^^^
He states that "[i]n the absence of information on what
employers and prospective employees expect when they enter
into an employment relationship, courts should presume that
each expects the relationship to continue as long as the
employee adequately performs the job."^^° Incidentally, he
also suggests that it is necessary to redefine the issue of
oral employment contracts. The new presumption of extended
employment, however, would be easily avoided if an employer
offers during the hiring process the express contract that
the employment relationship can be terminated at the will
of either party at any time without notice and explanation.
The current common law exceptions to the at-will
doctrine provide employees with less than uniform and suf-
ficient protection against wrongful discharge. Public
policy exceptions are applicable generally when public
health and safety violations are involved. The public
policy exception may also be unavailable to lower-level
^^^Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A
Changing Concept of Employment At Will, 17 Am. Bus. L.J.
467 (1980)
.
^^°Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust
Discharge: the Need for a Federal Statute, 16 J. of L.
Reform 319, 333 (1983)
.
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employees who tend to lack access to information that
allow them to blow the whistle on their superiors.
Implied contract exceptions are applicable only when
employees have received express or implied promises of job
security. In reality, however, employers are certainly
free not to issue employee handbooks containing a just-
cause provision and also are free to issue personnel
manuals that clearly tell that the manual is not part of
the employment contract. In states still adhering to the
traditional bilateral contract doctrine, company policies
in the handbook are unlikely to be recognized as the
employment contract. The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing has provided the least protection for discharged
employees. These exceptions do not go far enough.
The courts' ability to effect evolutions in the tort-
and contract law has been evident. It is unlikely, however,
that the courts are in fact moving toward adoption of such
new common law presumptions and recognition of tort liabil-
ity against unfair termination. ^^^ Both employers and
employees do not want the complicated and complex array of
statutory and common-law exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
Some specialized legislation will ultimately be necessary
for employees to be fully and effectively protected against
wrongful discharge.
^^^The California Supreme Court limited damage awards
in cases over a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
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3. Legislation
Professor Clyde Summers advocated comprehensive unfair
dismissal legislation as early as eighteen years ago.^^^
Noting that major industrial countries abroad recognized at
least some measure of job security, he concluded that
society should provide legal protection of employees' job
security by statute, in the most concrete fashion possible,
including just cause clauses as in collective bargaining
agreements .^^"^ A number of commentators agree that just
cause legislation is desirable .^^^
Proponents of legislation must face the issue of union
reaction; what would unions think about such a statute? It
has been a common assumption that most of unions would not
favor legislation protecting employees against wrongful
discharge because it would dilute the incentive for
employees to organize. One of the selling points that
union organizers can offer to employees is protection
against arbitrary dismissal.
Now, unions are beginning to support such statutes.
With a just-cause requirement generally applicable, it will
be far more difficult for employers to fire employees,
including union organizers and union sympathizers because
employers would have to show that some reasonable.
^^^Summers, supra note 12.
^^'-^Id. at 532.
^^^Stieber & Murray, Supra note 290
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acceptable bases other than unjust cause prohibited by
the National Labor Relations Act existed for the dis-
charge. ^^° The AFL-CIO's Executive Council has discarded
its long-standing ambivalence toward proposals for wrongful
discharge statutes. ^^^
There are other signs supporting the idea that legis-
lation will ultimately be needed. Bills forbidding wrong-
ful discharge have been introduced in about a dozen state
legislatures.^^''' Most of the proposed unjust dismissal laws
are similar. They typically require good or just cause for
dismissal, while limiting employer liability by requiring
arbitration rather than jury trials and by limiting damages
for pain, suffering, emotional distress or punitive
damages .^^^
Employers, who are well organized politically and are
influential in legislative assemblies, historically have
opposed any judicial or legislative action restricting
their employment practices and discretion. However, the
continued growth in common-law liability, particularly in
^^^Summers, supra note 12.
23*^1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) , Mar. 3, 1987 at 1.
^^'^California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virgin
Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. See, Summer, supra n.l4
at 58, see also, Krueger, supra note 41, at 650-60
(characteristics of proposed unjust-dismissal laws are
included)
.
^^^Krueger, Supra note 41.
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tort liability, for wrongful discharge probably have
swollen the uncertainty and expense that employers bear in
common law unjust-dismissal suits, which could shift the
employers' preference toward legislation of an appropriate
form.^^^ Legislation becomes an attractive alternative for
employers when it would limit the size of damage awards and
reduce the uncertainty in unjust-dismissal suits. Business
groups may come to support such proposed unjust-dismissal
statutes. ^°°
Nonunionized employees would benefit most from such
unjust dismissal laws, though some of them might lose
opportunities to receive large potential damage awards,
since wrongful dismissal legislation would most likely
include a cap on damages. It can be said that such laws
are a kind of compromise between limited employer lia-
bility and assumption of fault. "^"^
299See, e.g., LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law
and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A New
Order Begins, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 94, 108-09 (1990) ("[pjrior to
1987, the case-law development from Gates I to Crenshaw
generated a belief among Montana employers and insurance
companies who paid the damages for many employment tort
actions that their best hope for changing the direction of
the law was through direct legislative action.")
^'^^Krueger ^ supra note 41.
^°^Id. at 651. See also, Stieber & Baines, supra note
290, at 176-77. Listing a form of compromise, they state
that any bill must represent a compromise among various
interest groups such as employers, defense bar, trade
unions, plaintiff bar, non-union employees and academic
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Montana became the first state to enact a compre-
hensive law protecting employees against wrongful discharge,
the "Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act" (WDFEA) , in
July 1987. 3°2 ^j^g legislative history of this statute
originates from the uncertain contours of common law prior
to its enactment. Having recognized the possibility of a
wrongful discharge action and thus partly rejecting the
previously dominant presumption of at-will employment, the
Montana court first implied a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in employment contracts in Gates 1^°^ and
declared the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a tort rather than a contract action in Gates
11.^°^ In Nye v. Department of Livestock, ^^"^ the court gave a
broad sweep to the public policy tort of wrongful discharge.
In Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing,'^^^ the court
extended the covenant to employees who had received oral or
unintended objective manifestations by the employer of job
security .^°'^ The court also mentioned that neither a
lawyers. Job security is for many of our citizens one of
their most valued rights.
^"^Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-901 to 914 (1989).
^^^Gate V. Life of Montana Insurance Co., 196 Mont. 178,
638 P. 2d 1063 (1988) .
^^^Id., appeal after remand, 205 Mont. 304, 668 P. 2d
213 (1983)
.
305196 Mont. 222, 639 P. 2d 498 (1982).
306212 Mont. 274, 687 P. 2d 1015 (1984).
3o^Jd. at 282, 687 P. 2d at 1020.
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statute nor a regulation was necessary as a prerequisite
for a wrongful discharge action found on public policy. ^^"^
Particularly from 1982 through 1985, the Montana
Supreme Court steadily expanded the grounds for wrongful
discharge suits and extended the good faith obligation to
all employment contracts, along with tort remedies ."^"^
If a majority of the justices was unsatisfied with the
developing state of the law but was unwilling to reverse
such decisions as Gates I & II, Dare, and Flanigan, their
anxiety was swept away by the subsequent enactment of
wrongful dismissal legislation which prevented the court
from going further. As such, Montana employers and
insurance companies, who had paid the damages for
employment tort actions, supported the bill, and this
support was followed by enactment.
Finally, in August of 1991, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the "Model
Employment Termination Act, " which would provide protection
for employees against wrongful discharge in states still
adhering to the at-will rule, but which would sharply limit
the damages recoverable. The adoption of a Model Act is
considered a starting point for legislative action.
^^^Id. at 280, 687 P. 2d at 1019.
^^^E.g., Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association, 720 P. 2d 257 (Mont), appeal dismissed, 107
S.Ct. 564 (1986) (upholding an award of $1.4 million in
punitive damages to a thirty-year employee)
.
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4. Proposal for Federal Legislation
The developments noted above indicate a growing
tendency among the states toward broader protection against
unjust discharge. Again, an explosion of various employ-
ment statutes prohibiting employers' unfair dismissal
practices also indicates that both federal and state
governments consider the employement relationship deserving
of sustained intervention. -^'^ The time is now ripe for
unjust dismissal legislation. Particularly, this papaer
advocates federal legislation is the appropriate remedy. ~^^'
Federal legislation is the best approach because
wrongful discharge is a problem common to every state.
Since protection of jobs is commonly important to all
workers in the United States, state legislation on a state-
by-state basis against unjust dismissal would be often
inadequately enforced. A federal statute applying
uniformly to the entire country and providing uniform
standards would probably be the best approach. ^^^^
At the same time, state legislation seems more likely
to be enacted in states other than Montana in the near
^'"Elisabeth C. Brandon, The Employment At Will
Doctrine, 15 Hastings Const. L. Q. 359, 380 (1988) .
^^'a full consideration of underlying issues of federal
legislation, such as preemption problems of wrongful
discharge claims, is far beyond the scope of this paper.
^^^See Stieber & Murray, supra note 290, at 336 ("The
appropriate remedy for the problem of unjust discharge is
comprehensive federal legislation").
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future. It may be easier to persuade some progressive
state legislatures to break new ground in this area, and
such state legislation would be meaningful because
"[ejnacting such legislation on a state-by-state basis
would permit the variety and experimentation that is
necessary to test new legislation before introducing it
into the federal system. "^^^ Although comprehensive federal
legislation is the appropriate long-term remedy for the
problem of wrongful discharge, state legislative efforts
are important as well.
'^^^Id. at 336 (citing Summers, supra note 12, at 521
n.4) .
CHAPTER V
GOOD CAUSE LEGISLATION
Part IV concluded that a comprehensive federal statute
is the most appropriate remedy for the problem of unjust
discharge and the most preferable vehicle for achieving
reform.
The "Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act" enacted
in Montana (hereinafter as the Montana Act), the Model
Employment Termination Act adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (herein-
after as the Model Act), and the bills introduced in
several state legislatures in the 1980s''^^'^ are similar in
many respects. Most of the laws provide that discharge
must be for "good cause, " encourage resort to arbitration
rather than to jury trials, and frequently allow reinstate-
ment with back pay, which is typically unavailable under
the common law.
Proponents of such wrongful dismissal legislation
confront a number of considerations to be taken into
accounts such as the "good cause" standard, dispute
'^'^E.g. , California, 1986 [SB 1827], Colorado, 1981 [HB
1495], Michigan, 1982 [HB 5892], Pennsylvania, 1981 [HB
1742], Vermont, 1988 [SB 299], Washington, 1987 [HB 1133],
Wisconsin, 1981 etc.
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procedures, remedies, and employer and employee coverage.
In an attempt to offer an appropriate comprehensive
legislative scheme, the remainder of this Article discusses
such considerations by analyzing the prevalence of good
cause/arbitration models among the proposed and enacted
laws
.
A. The Good Cause Standard
A major feature of the Montana Act is that it replaces
employment at-will with a good cause standard requiring
employers to have "good cause" to discharge an employee.
Under the Montana Act, a discharge'^^^ is wrongful if: (1)
it was in retaliation for refusal to violate public policy
or for reporting a violation of public policy; (2) it was
not for good cause and the employee had completed the
employer's probationary employment period; or (3) the
employer violated express provisions of its own personnel
policy. ^^^
As noted above, the Act states that a wrongful
discharge can arise in three different ways. It is an
example of the shift in employers' perceptions of what was
^^''"Discharge" is defined as any termination of
employment including resignition, elimination of the job,
lay off or lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and
any other cutback in the number of employees for a
legitimate business reason. Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-903
(2) (1989) .
^^'^ont CA 39-2-904.
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an acceptable public policy on employee discharges .^''^
The Act also acknowledges the prevalence of express
contract exceptions under today's common law. The legisla-
ture expanded protections against wrongful discharge to
cover more employees by imposing a good cause duty on
employers
.
Modeled after the Montana Act, the Model Act also
adopted the good cause standard, providing that "an
employer may not terminate the employment of an employee
without good cause. ""^^^ The language of the provisions
found in the bills proposed in several state legislatures
is identical to that of the Model Act.'^^^
1. Definitions of "Good Cause"
What is "Good Cause" is a substantive issue to be
discussed. It is certainly a critical term. Under the
Montana Act, the definition of good cause is "reasonable
^^"^The Act prohibits discharges against public policy,
although public policy is defined narrowly. ("Public
policy " is defined as a policy in effect at the time of
the discharge concerning the public health, safety, or
welfare established by constitutional provision, statute,
or administrative rule. Mont CA 39-2-903(7)).
^^^The Model Employment Termination Act, Section 3
(a) (1991) .
'^^^E.g., "An employer shall not discharge an employee
except for just cause," Michigan, 1982 [HB 5892], and "a
discharge is wrongful if it is not for good cause,
"
California, 1986 [SB 28001].
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job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to
satisfactorily perform job duties disruption of the
employer's operation, or other legitimate business
reasons. "^^° The Model Act defines "good cause" as follows:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee
for termination of the employee's employment in view of
relevant factors and circumstances, which may include the
employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct (on the job or
otherwise)
,
job performance, and employment record; or
(ii) the exercise of business judgment in good faith by the
employer, including setting its economic or institutional
goals and determining methods to achieve those goals,
organizing or reorganizing operations, discontinuing,
consolidating, or divesting operations or positions or
parts of operations or positions, determining the size of
its work force and the nature of the position filled by its
work force, and determining and changing standards of
performance for positions . ""^^^
Although the definition of good cause in the Model Act
seems reasonably more specific than that in the Montana Act,
both definitions embody the same idea that good cause as
the basis for termination or discharge of employees in-
cludes both causes related to the individual employee and
legitimate business or economic reasons.
320Mont CA 39-2-903 (5) .
^^^The Model Employment Termination Act, Section 1(4).
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2. Individual Causes and Business Reasons
a. Individual Causes
According to the good cause statute of Montana, an
employer may discharge an employee for his unsatisfactory
performance on the job. An underlying rationale of the
provision may be the understanding of both parties in the
employment relationship that the employer must pay the
agreed wages and benefits while the employee must do
"satisfactory" work in return. -^^^ "Satisfactory" work or
job performance is obviously not a precise concept. It may
vary from employers to employers.
For instance. Professor Abrams and Professor Nolan
note that "satisfactory" work in the employment context has
four elements: "(1) regular attendance, (2) obedience to
reasonable work rules, (3) a reasonable quantity and quality
of work, and (4) avoidance of any conduct that would
interfere with the employer's ability to operate the
business successfully . "'^^'^ An employee's failure to meet
these obligations will justify discipline .^^^
Regular attendance is the most fundamental duty for
employees. Excessive absenteeism and tardiness are likely
to constitute good cause because such conduct is likely to
^^^Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 Duke L. J. 594, at 598-99
(1985)
.
'''Id. at 597.
'''Id.
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lead to inadequate performance of the job as well as
interferring with the order of the workplace ."^^^
Regular attendance is not necessarily an absolute
obligation for employees. Where absences are for a good
reason, such as a pattern of absenteeism based on an
industrial injury, and are unlikely to continue in the
future, discharge may be found unreasonable ."^^^
Employee conduct violating work rules also constitutes
"good cause" for a termination.'^^'^ Work rules regulate
employee conduct in order to maintain the safety and order
of the workplace and maximize the productivity of the
company. Violation of reasonable work rules is a
legitimate cause for discipline .'^^^ In this instance, the
rules must be legitimate.
Inadequate performance, incompetence, and neglect of
work may deserve discipline if the standards of evaluation
used by the employer are reasonable. The good cause
standard in lieu of at-will employment is not to protect
unproductive workers nor does it guarantee continued
^^^Supra note 322, at 613. (Arbitrators tend to uphold
dismissals where an employee is tardy or absent more than
other employees and is likely to continue indifferently in
the future regardless of repeated warning. Id.).
^^^Id. at 614.
^^'''Examples of "good cause" under this category include
conducts such as assault, theft, fighting on the job,
destruction of property, or use of drugs or alcohol on the
job [Id.) .
'^'^^Id. at 614-15.
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employment to an employee. Management can discipline or
discharge an employee who is incapable of performing his
job or who neglects his duties in its pursuit of produc-
tivity.
Insubordination has been a well-recognized ground for
discharge. -^^^ It is taken for granted that employees have
duties to follow rules or instructions and to be loyal to
their employer's interests. Thus, an intentional refusal
to follow orders without a reasonable excuse constitutes
good cause for discharge .'^'^°
In the determination of good cause for a termination
because of insubordination, however, the reasonableness of
a company order refused or rejected should be considered.
There are a number of possible defenses that a grievant can
raise depending on the circumstances. The employee's
refusal to comply with an order on grounds that it is
unsafe, unreasonable, illegal, or immoral may be excused.
"When an employee can establish that there has either
been actual past harm incurred in a particular assignment
or that a reasonable person would have feared for life,
limb, or property, "'*'*' a discipline offered by terminating
the employee is likely to be regarded as abusive.
^^^Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 127.
^^^Circle Security Agency, Inc. v. Ross, 107 111. App.
3d 195, 437 N.E.2d 667 (1982); Deason v. Mobil Oil Co., 407
So. 2d 486 (La. Ct . App. 1981).
^"^^Fortado, Travis, & Jennings, Refusal to Accept a
Work Assignment : How Arbitrators Rule in Discharge Cases,
110
The simple spectre of health and safety does not
itself excuse an employee's refusal to accept a work
assignment .^^^ Arbitrators would only regard an assign-
ment's inappropriateness if it repeatedly affected the
health conditions of other workers in the past and the
refusal by the employee is exactly based on such circum-
stances .
Occasionally, however, employees may be discharged for
their health. In Stowe-woodward Co.,^'^^ for example, an
arbitrator concluded that the employee was discharged
because he was unable to work in the plant because of his
health, severe asthmatic reaction to the work environment,
contending that "an employer has the right to expect an
employee to be available for work with reasonable regu-
larity. "^^'^
Other reasons such as those of religion and morality
"are also common employee defenses for their refusal of
work assignment but [they] are difficult to establish to an
arbitrator's satisfaction. "^^^ The tendency of arbitrators
to sustain discharges or some other disciplines indicate
that these defenses are often regarded as flimsy.
16 Employee Rel. L. J. 205, 208 (1990) .
^^^Id. at 209.
^^^78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1038 (1982) (Thompson Arb . ) .
^^Vortado et al., supra note 331, at 209.
^^^Id. at 209-10. (E.g., Centreville Clinics, Inc., 85
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1059 ( 1985) (Talarico Arb.); and Crucible,
Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 83 (1983), Id.).
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Employee misconduct interfering with the operation
may include off-duty conduct. Employee off-duty conduct
away from the workplace may be "good cause, " if it is
relevant to the employer's successful operation, to
business reputation or to similar concerns. Some off-duty
misconduct violating no work rule may sometimes warrant
discipline if the conduct raises serious doubt as to his
future trustworthiness, tarnishes the company's reputation,
and jeopardizes the business image. ~^'^^
However, off-duty activity of the employee bearing no
reasonable relationship to the employee's job performance
and business reputation will not constitute just cause.
Thus, the employer must demonstrate a nexus with its
business needs. The most careful evaluation by employers
in order to avoid overreaction on unfounded fears is also
needed. ^'^''
b. Economic and Business Grounds
Dismissals that are part of large-scale coordinated
layoffs necessitating economic downturns have been
generally viewed as valid. The Model Act defines that the
exercise of business judgment, including setting its
economic or institutional goals and determining methods to
achieve those goals and the size and composition of the
336
'Abrams & Nolan, supra note 322, at 616.
'^^'^Id. at 616-17
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work force by the employer, constitutes "good cause."
The Montana court formulated its own definition of the term
of "legitimate business reason" as follows:
[a] legitimate business reason is a
reason that is neither false,
whimsical, arbitrary or capricious,
and it must have some logical
relationship to the needs of the
business. In applying this defini-
tion, one must take into account the
right of an employer to exercise
discretion over who it will employ
and keep in employment. Of equal
importance to this right, however, is
the legitimate interests of the
employee to secure employment .^^^
In light of the particular circumstances of each case
and a balancing of the employer' s interest in operating and
maintaining a business efficiently and profitably with the
employee's interest in maintaining employment, legitimate
economic or business reasons which require a reduction in
force, such as a general recession and poor business, may
be offered by employers in defense of wrongful discharge
claims
.
It should be noted, however, that reductions in force
based on economic and business grounds per se do not
constitute good cause for discharge. The employer's
decisions as to the economic goals and methodologies of the
^^^Buck V. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., 24:
Mont. 276, 281-82, 811 P. 2d 537, 540 (1991).
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enterprise and the size of the work force must be
governed by "honest business judgment ."
In the context of discharges based on economic and
business grounds, the employer's required fairness in
judgment would include three essential notions:
(1) reasonableness of the employer's judgment; (2 ) procedural
fairness; and (3) industrial consistent treatment among the
same group of employees.
The law would not necessarily require the employer to
prove layoffs or dismissals motivated by the employer's
economic situation be the only measures in order to protect
business in an economically hard situation. It would be
enough that reasonable employers believe that the most
stringent form of discipline, e.g., layoffs, is needed to
protect the system of business and to get it going as a
reasonable means in the circumstances.
The fact that a growing number of states and the
federal government have enacted plant closure legislation
which requires notification of closing information to be
provided to employees , or the award of severance benefits
to assist in relocation endorses the importance for employ-
ers to respond to procedural fairness including advance
notice to the employees in the context of economic or
collective dismissals. Expanding notions of employer
liability for nondisclosure would be also important.
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Examples of legitimate grounds for selecting a
particular employee for layoff include the employee's past
performance on the job, attendance record, seniority, etc.
An individual employee may still contest his selection
for layoff on the grounds that it was discriminatory under
certain federal, state, or local discrimination laws or
established public policy.
Economic motivations for cutbacks in the work force
have been generally viewed as supplying the requirement of
just cause because an employer's decision as to the
economic goals and methodologies of the enterprise are
viewed as basic to the system of free enterprise. Layoffs
during a recession, however, are likely to be even more
devastating in terms of reemployment possibilities because
of the lack of jobs in other sectors. Since economic and
business reasons for discharge are unrelated to the
employee's conduct or performance of the job, application
of the good faith standard in analyzing the legitimacy of
the collective discharges and in expansion of the employer
liability for nondisclosure in the exercise of business
judgment is also needed.
3. Concepts of Good Cause: Subjective V. Objective
"Just cause" or "good cause" for termination connotes
a fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith
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on the part of the employer. ^^^ The employer's good faith
belief in the existence of cause for an employee's
dismissal is the critical fact in many cases.
One case has held that good faith belief that good
cause existed was sufficient to justify discharge .'^'*° The
court in Coombs v. Gamer Shoe Co. seems to apply a similar
subjective test.^''^ The court stated that an employer may
terminate an employee as long as the employer gives a fair
and honest reason. ^''^ This test is comparable to the good
faith requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)~^^'*
that has generally been interpreted as imposing a sub-
jective test which relies on motive instead of actual
knowledge
.
The employer' s good faith belief must focus on both
the employee's performance and assertions that if true
would amount to just cause. The court in Sanders v. Parker
Drilling Company^'^ illustrates the question of whether the
employer need only show that he acted in good faith based
on the information available, or if the employer must prove
^^^Pugh V. See's Candies, Inc. (1st Dist) 116 Cal. App
3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, appeal after remand (1st Dist)
203 Cal. App. 3d 753, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195.
^^^Simpson v. Western Graphics, 293 Ore. 96, 643 P. 2d
1276 (1982) . .
^''^778 P. 2d 845 (Mont .)( 1989) .
^^^Id. at 887.
^^^U.C.C. §1-201 (19) (1989) .
^^911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990).
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that the employee actually committed a wrongdoing. This
is the issue of subjective and objective standards which
has been discussed in some wrongful discharge cases.
Under Alaska law, two separate questions must be
answered: whether employee actually engaged in conduct the
employer alleges, and whether that conduct constitutes good
cause for termination of employment .'^^^ The court concluded
the employer must show the discharged employee engaged in
alleged prohibited conduct, an employer's subjective belief
that it possessed good cause is insufficient.
Indeed, the actual facts of the case would become
insignificant if only the employer's mental state or
subjective state of mind mattered. "^''^ It is odd that
employees could be fired based on their employer' s good-
faith but nonetheless wholly mistaken beliefs. Application
of such a subjective test would reduce good cause to an
almost meaningless concept .^'''''
An employer's subjective and honest belief that the
employee committed an improper act does not itself amount
to good cause. The "good cause" for discharge means that,
first, the employer must show that the employee committed
an act which warrants his discharge and, then second, the
employer must have a reasonable ground for his decision to
terminate the employee in good faith. Thus, if the
^^^Id. at 194.
^^'id. at 196.
'^^Id. at 197.
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employer cannot prove the employee engaged in alleged
misconduct which constitutes cause for discharge, even
though the employer possessed a subjective belief, he does
not have just cause for terminating the employee.
The second component of the objective standard is also
important. The employer must not only have actual cause
for discharge but must act in good faith. '^^^ This com-
ponent implies two principles. First, even where actual
cause exists, the employer cannot use the actual cause as a
pretext for an unlawful discriminatory action or arbitrary
discharge. Second, the employer must act fairly in
deciding whether discharge is an appropriate and reasonable
discipline
.
Incidentally, in order to avoid the courts' struggles
seen in cases applying the subjective test, advance notice
is meaningful. The issue of whether the employer must
prove that the employee actually committed the alleged
misconduct would be solved by advance notice to the
employee, because such a notice will let him know that he
is subject to som.e discipline and will also give him an
opportunity to prove that he has not actually committed the
alleged wrongdoing subject to discipline.
B. Procedural Fairness
'''id.
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The remainder of this article will outline the
following considerations which drafters of a federal unjust
dismissal statute should take into account.
1. Dispute Procedures
Whether a wrongful dismissal statute should send
claims directly to the regular courts, to an administrative
agency, or to arbitration raises procedural fairness
questions. Arbitration of unjust discharges shoud be
recommended because that method of resolution combines
speed, economy, and informality.
A complaint procedure should be designed to minimize
legalistic formality and to resolve cases with finality at
the earliest possible stage. Effective procedures are
essential to the success of any system seeking to provide
comprehensive, speedy, and less costly protection against
wrongful discharge. In that sense, mediation-arbitration
procedures should be given high priority in any wrongful
dismissal legislation. •^'^^
Under the proposed bills, parties are generally
encouraged to resolve their disputes via binding
arbitration. '''° The Montana Act also encourages resort to
'^'^^The Michigan Bill of 1982 recommends this model.
^^°The proposed unjust dismissal bills in several
states typically rely on arbitration. Some recommend
mediation-arbitration procedures. E.g., Michigan, 1982 [HB
5892]; and Pennsylvani, 1981 [HB 1742] (15 days advance
notice of reasons for discharge required; then mediation,
followed by binding and final arbitration)
.
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arbitration, though arbitration is an option that the
parties can establish if they so agree. '^^^ Under the unique
arbitration clause of the Montana Act, if a complaint is
filed, either party may request the commencing of arbitra-
tion within sixty days."^^^ Where the other party rejects
the request to arbitrate and loses the lawsuit, that party
will be liable for the other party's attorney fees incurred
subsequent to the date of the offer.'^^'^ Where a valid offer
is accepted, arbitration is the exclusive remedy for the
wrongful discharge dispute, thus the arbitrator's award is
final and binding. -^^^
Proponents of legislation recommending arbitration
procedures confront a number of issues, however. Most of
the proposals for statutory arbitration of wrongful
discharge claims regard the relative finality of awards as
one of the most attractive features of the arbitration
model, which seeks to limit the grounds for judicial review.
Presumably arbitrators would at least attempt to follow the
guidance of the courts. But in the statutory wrongful
discharge setting, there may be some arbitrators who give
their own interpretation to a statutory term such as "good
cause" or "good faith." In order for arbitration to be
utilized and to be a forum which produces a decision of
^'^Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-914.
^'^ont. Code Ann. §39-2-914(3).
^^^ont. Code Ann. §39-2-914(4).
^^^Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-914(6).
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high quality, the existence of arbitrators with experi-
ence and expertise is as important as the construction of
the workable system.
In an attempt to make the system fair, effective, and
appropriate, it would seem desirable to set a preliminary
mediation stage of minimum duration before a case could go
to the final arbitration. "^^^ The initial time spent with
the employer and the mediator-arbitrator, understanding the
facts and circumstances, would control the arbitrator's
exercise of discretion, which sometimes may be troublesome
and may produce a compromise.
After mediation is exhausted, the employee would be
allowed to pursue the claim to final and binding arbitra-
tion. The facts revealed during the initial mediation
stage would narrow the issues for arbitration. The
mediation-arbitration procedure is attractive because it
avoids those problems with judicial alternatives and covers
a number of implicit disadvantages in statutory arbitration.
2. Remedies
Proposals for unjust dismissal legislation will face
the problem of providing a suitable remedy for wrongful
discharge. Under the various exceptions to the at-will
rule developed in state courts, wrongfully discharged
35
^inda & Raab, supra note 10, at 1194-96
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employees have been permitted only money damages. ^^^
Under the rule at common law, monetary relief given in the
form of a money judgment has been considered an adequate
remedy for those found to be wrongfully discharged.
a. Reinstatement
There has been an almost recognized bar to the
exercise of a court's equitable powers in wrongful dis-
charge cases. Unlike monetary remedies, equitable relief
in the form of reinstatement or injunction against dis-
charge has been imposed by only a few common law courts.
On the other hand, reinstatement with back pay constitutes
a major sanction for enforcement of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) . In deciding cases under the various
discrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), ^^"^ and the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act (ADEA),'^^^ courts have not been reluctant to
order reinstatement.
The reluctance of courts to order reinstatement under
the common law seems to stem from various reasons. First,
a general recognition that as a prerequisite for equitable
relief or reinstatement, relief at law, i.e., money damages,
~^°^Remedies can range from a small award of back pay to
punitive and compensatory damage awards when liability is
premised on a tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy or the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
^"42 U.S.C.A. §2000 et seq.
^^^29 U.S.C.A. §621 et seq.
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must be inadequate to compensate for the actual injury.
Courts have recognized that relief at law in the form of a
money judgment is an adequate remedy for wrongful discharge
in most of the cases.
Second, the denial of reinstatement as a remedy rests
on the general objection to ordering specific performance
of contracts requiring judicial supervision. -^^^ The court's
reasoning would be a rather exaggerated analogy that it
would be impractical, if not impossible, for a court to
provide the continual supervision necessary for specific
enforcement of personal service contracts. Where the court
orders reinstatement, it would need to intervene only in
the event the employee subsequently complained of discharge
or unfair treatment in the workplace .^^° The common law
tradition of avoiding remedies that need for judicial
supervision should be eroded.
Third, perhaps as the strongest objection to the
remedy of reinstatement, some commentators criticize the
proposal recommending reinstatement based on the problem of
forced association. Professor West states that reinstate-
ment may be a harsh consequence for both employers and
employees when they find the workplace a hostile
'^''^"At common law it was recognized that a person cannot,
by decree of court, be compelled to retain another in his
service" (Xurie v. Evangelical Hospital Association, 89 111.
App.3d 45, 411 N.E.2d 326 (1980)).
'^^^Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 417.
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environment after the resolution of their dispute. ^^^
Some courts also state that, since personal service
contracts often require a cooperative relationship and
trust in the workplace, reinstatement is not appropriate .'^^^
Like the problem of judicial supervision, the forced
association argument is also exaggerated. "^^"^ Any request
for reinstatement should not be summarily dismissed as
unworkable, but should be examined according to the
particular case's facts and circumstances. To be more
precise, the possibility and appropriateness of the
reinstatement order should be examined, for instance, in
the context of the group's size, the nature of the employ-
ee's job, and the nature of the working relationships among
the colleagues and with the superiors.
All of the above grounds for the courts' avoiding
reinstatement as a remedy should not loom as obstacles to
reinstatement, nor should lack of a statutory mandate
preclude courts from ordering reinstatement as an
alternative. Absent the presence of a duty imposed by
^^^West, The Case Against Reinstatemnet in Wrongful
Discharge, 1988 III. L. Rev. 1. (according to the reserch,
anywhere from a third to a half of employees offered
reinstatement under National Labor Relations Board orders
decline to return to the privious employer)
.
^^^E.g.^ Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists^ Ltd., 73
Ill.App.3d 901, 905 (1979).
^^'^"No reason for precluding reinstatement out of an
exaggerated regard for the employee's psychic well-being,"
St. Antoine, supra note 250, at 79.
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statute, however, it would be unlikely for courts to
order reinstatement as a remedy even if appropriate in
today's common law. Thus, it is recommended that the
legislature require reinstatement of a terminated employ-
ee. '^^'^ Moreover, justifications for equitable relief in the
form of reinstatement must be meaningful, in particular,
during the severe job market conditions that make reemploy-
ment in similar work and pay unlikely.
b. The Statutory Remedy of Reinstatement
Any unjust dismissal legislation should offer suitable
and flexible remedies for wrongful discharge including
reinstatement when appropriate. The proposed bills'^^''' and
^^''"We recognize, however, that there are certain areas
of the law where the legislature has required reinstatement
of an employee by a private employer, e.g., when an employ-
ee is discriminated against becasue of race, color, creed
or sex." Antoine, supra note 250, at 79.
^^'The California Bill of 1988 [SB 1988] (the arbitrator
may award, among other things, reinstatement, back pay, and
attorney fees); the Michigan Bill of 1982 [HB 5892] (the
arbitrator may award reinstatement with or without back pay
or severance pay) ; the Pennsylvania Bill of 1981 [HB
1742] (the arbitrator may reinstate the employee with no,
partial, or full back pay, or award a severance payment
with no reinstatement) ; and the Washington Bill of 1987 [HB
1133] (arbitration award may include compensation for all
economic loss, reinstatement, and up to 3 years of future
lost wages. No punitive damages provided).
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the Model Act^^^ containing a just cause firing re-
quirement frequently allow reinstatement in non-union
settings
.
Under the Model Act, for example, an arbitrator may
make one or more of the following remedies for wrongful
discharge violating the Act:
(1) reinstatement to the position of
employment the employee held when
employment was terminated or, if that
is impractical, to a comparable
position;
(2) full or partial backpay and reim-
bursement for lost fringe benefits,
with interest, reduced by interim
earnings from employment elsewhere,
benefits received, and amounts that
could have been received with
reasonable diligence;
(3) if reinstatement is not awarded, a
lump-sum severance payment at the
employee' s rate of pay in effect
before the termination, for a period
not exceeding [36 months] after the
date of the award, together with the
value of fringe benefits lost during
that period, reduced by likely
earnings and benefits from employment
elsewhere, and taking into account
such equitable considerations as the
employee's length of service with the
employer and the reasons for the
termination; and
366The Model Act Sec. 7(b) (l)-(4
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(4) reasonable attorney's fees and
costs. ^^"^
Reinstatement is the preferred remedy for terminations
in violation of this Act. Reinstatement as a remedy for
wrongful discharge, indeed, raises the difficult question
of whether it is appropriate and effective in the nonunion-
ized sector. American experts appear to be divided on this
issue. What is important, however, is that an unjust
dismissal statute offer a range of remedies, including
reinstatement and back pay with interest for a fixed period,
If reinstatement is not feasible because of the worsened
relations between the parties which would adversely
influence efficiency in the workplace and the safety of
others, severance pay may be awarded instead. "^^^
'''id.
368The Model Act Sec. 7(b) (3;
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Today, job security is for many American citizens one
of their most valued rights and important expectations. It
provides a multitude of benefits to both employees and
employers. Job security provides employees with economic
stability and self-esteem, while it provides employers with
improved morale, productivity, lower labor turnover, and
expertise. Employers should owe their employees a duty to
treat them with fundamental fairness, Limiitation of the
employment at will doctrine requires only fundamental
fairness. It does not make employers keep unproductive
employees
.
Common law exceptions to the at will employment, based
on public policy, the implied-in-f act covenant, and the
im.plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, have been
significant restraints on the wrongful exercise of an
employer's powers. Judicial recognition of such exceptions
in one state continued to break paths for decisions in
other states. ^^^ These common-law exceptions, however, do
not amount to protection of all employees' rights in the
^""The state of Montana furthered its recognition to
the good-cause legislation.
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workplace. They also leave employees and employers
unsure of the legality of personnel action in the workplace.
Total abolition of at-will employment by unjust-
dismissal legislation will ultimately be necessary for all
employees to be fully and effectively protected against
wrongful discharge. It will also reduce the uncertainty
and expense inherent in common law wrongful dismissal suits.
For as "wrongful discharge" protection for all employees in
the country becomes more of a reality, the enactment of
federal legislation of this kind is inevitable.
FOR Lli::.^. di
